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ABSTRACT 
Public enterprises play an . t· lmpor .ant role in Canadian 
economic life; they could once be found in almost every sector of 
the economy. Various models have been advanced to explain the 
origins of public enterprises in Canada. This thesis is an 
attempt to examine the political culture and political economy 
approaches, and to determine the appropriate model for the 
e~)lanaticm of the origins of federal public enterprises. 
The origins of selected public enterprises and former public 
enterprises, including Canadian National Railways, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, Air Canada, Polymer Ltd, Canada 
Development Corporation, De Havilland, Canadair Ltd and 
PetroCanada, are examined to determine which of the models 
provides a better explanation of their creation. 
This thesis argues that, although, the origins of public 
enterprise cannot be explained by a single model, the political 
economy approach is a better model for capturing the dynamism of 
the phenomenon. However, although the political economy approach 
is a better model, its explanatory power could be enhanced by 
. t . lncorpora .lng aspects of other models. 
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CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION 
Governments employ many forms of policy instruments to intervene 
in the economy. Allan Tupper and Bruce Doern identified four 
pol icy i nst.l"'uments employed by governments. These ar·e e::<hortiEltion, 
expend i tUl"'e, l"'el;;;JLII at i on and pub Ii c c.wner'sh i p . [ 1 :I 
The thesis will focus on public enter'pr'ises in Canada. There 
are public enter'prises at all levels of gover'nment in Canada. 
Municipal, provincial, and federal governments have all 
established public enterprises at one time or another'. However', 
the principal focus of this thesis is feder'al public enterpr'ises. 
Although the structure, extent and nature of public enterprises 
in Canada are unique, the public enter'pr'ise phenomenon pervades 
all parts of the world. Every society in the wOr'ld has some form 
of public enterprise, although the degree and extent may vary 
fr'om country to countr'y. 
In the pluralist democr'atlc states, it is generally pr'esumed 
that a perfect competitive mar'ket will allocate resources 
efficiently and determine pr'oduction techniques with minimal 
government intervention. However, since the mar'ket is imper'fect, 
there ar'e positive and normative r'easons why governments 
intervene in the economy. The r'ationales for government 
intervention are numer'ous. 
Market failure is a positive rationale for government 
intervention. Sometimes the market is unable to allocate 
resources efficiently. This occurs in the production of car'tain 
goods and services which involve 'externalities'. Externalities 
are the unintended effects of economic activities. The market 
mechanism is unable to internalize externalities in the pricing 
mechanIsm, hence the private sector is not motivated to undertake 
certain economic ventures, although they may be socially 
desirable. In other cases, external diseconomies which the 
private sector is unable to internalize in the pricing of goods 
and services could motivate the private sector to undertake 
production activities that are socially unacceptable. External 
economies and diseconomies provide positive rationales for 
government intervention. 
Sometimes the production techniques required in certain 
industries could lead to the domination of these industries by a 
few firms or a SIngle firm. Such a market outcome leads to the 
development - ~ WI natural monopolies, resulting in inefficiency and 
undesIrable pricing policies. Government intervention is 
necessary to stem the development of natural monopolies. 
Another instance of market failure is related to the 
production of public goods or services such as the prOVISIon of 
police services or education. Public goods are characterized by 
" .f I .] . J non-eXClU~a)l .IGY in consumption; explicitly. consumers cannot be 
excluded from the consumption of public goods. The problem of 
free-riders makes it impossible for the market mechanism to 
articulate consumer preferences and values for public goods. If 
left to the private sector, there will either be no production, 
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or gross inefficiency and duplication in the production of public 
goods. Thus, there is a need for government intervention to 
ensure the production of public goods. 
If market forces are left uncontrolled, they might produce 
some socially unacceptable results and preclude social equity. 
With respect to certain goods or services which are considered 
socially desirable, such as education and health services. the 
market mechanism alone cannot ensure the availability of these 
services to all the members of the society. A normative criterion 
for social equity provides a rationale for government 
intervention. 
These are some of the positive reasons why governments 
intervene in the economy. When governments do intervene, they may 
use anyone of the policy instruments or a combination of policy 
instruments to achieve policy objectives. 
A comparative overview of the economic activities of public 
enterprises in seven European countries in Table 1 reveals the 
importance of public enterprises. The Table adopted from Jeanne 
Laux and Maureen Molot[2J reveals that in the 1970s public 
enterprises experienced some growth in all countries except 
Britain. Table 1 reveals that the share of investments in the 
economy by public enterprises increased in all countries except 
Britain. In Italy and Austria 47.1 percent and 49.9 percent of 
respective gross fixed capital formation in the economy was 
accounted for by public enterprises in 1979. In 1979, 25.4 
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H~8LE 1 ECONOM I C ACT I V I TY OF PU8L IS: ENTERPR H:;~S I"L E.1!ROPE;. 
EMPLOYMENT @ INVESTMENT # 
1973 1976 1979 1972: 1976 1979 
8p i t.ali n 7. f., 7.9 ,-, t=, . 1 23.6 2:3. i5 20.0 
8elgium r .-, ':' . ..::. 6.4 6.6 12.4 1'-' .-, .;:.. .. .:, 12:.0 
Fl"'ance 10.7 1 1 .5 1 1 . E: 22.4 28. 1 30 . .5 
W . Gel~fflany 10.3 10. :3 10.5 16.9 17. 1 "2.7 
Holland 5.4 5.6 5 .::: '3.8 12. 1 10.8 
It.aly 14. 1 24.6 2.5.4* :35.0 4.6.7 47. U: 
Aus"t.l"'ia 21 .6 20.8 4:3. 1 49. 1 
Spain :::: ~ 6 4. 1 18.7 1 :3 . .5 
@. Employees as a pel"'cent.age of act.ive population out.side 
#. Gposs fixed capit.al fOl"'mat.ion as a pepcent.age of GFCF fop 
t.he economy as a whole 
*. Figures fol"' 1978 
~':.iEit;;:.!.i t.ali sm: Publ i c Ent.el-'Rr i ses in Canada, I t.haca, 
Cornell Universit.y Press, 1988 p.13 
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percent of the non-agriculture labour force was accounted for by 
public enterprises in Italy, while in Austria it was 20.8 
percent. In West Germany and Belgium 12.7 percent and 13 percent 
of the respective gross fixed capital formation was accounted for 
by public enterprises. 
Table 1 also reveals that, although the eight countries 
surveyed have public enterprises, the extent and degree varies 
from country to country. In terms of investment, Britain had a 
bigger Dublic sector than Belgium, West Germany, Spain and 
Holland, but smaller than France, Italy and Austria. 
At the end of the 1970s, 50 of the 500 largest industrial 
corporations outside the United States were owned by governments 
[3J. This suggests that, although governments employ many forms 
of policy instruments to intervene in the economy, public 
enterprises are important policy instruments in most countries. 
In North America, the United States and Canada also have 
their share of public enterprises, although with varying degree 
and intensity. Canada is presumed to have a relatively larger 
public sector than the United States. In the mid 1970s, the 
government accounted for 41 percent of Canada's GNP in terms of 
expend:it.ure c':'mpal~ed to 34 pe·('ct?nt. in t.he United !:::t.ates, :in 19:3::;:: 
the rat.io was 44 to 38.[4J (Although these figures suggest that 
Canada has a larger public sector than t.he United States, it. does 
not necessarily mean public enterprises are more extensive in 
Canada than the Unit.ed States.) In Canada publ:ic corporations 
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have been employed by all levels of government to pursue various 
policy objectives, Today, crown corporations are important in 
almost every sector of the Canadian economy, This fact was noted 
by the Economic Council of Canada in 1986 when the Council 
remarked that "government corporations are clearly a major 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 
Since the focus of the essay is federal public enterprises, 
it will be analytically necessary to define and identify federal 
public enterprises, Attempts to formulate an all-embracing 
definition are fraught with numerous problems, 
In 1951 the federal government attempted to define a crown 
defined a crown corporation as a "corporation that is ultimately 
accountable. through a minister, to the parliament for the 
conduct of affairs and includes the corporations named in 
!::;ch!:::!dul~2 B, :::;chedLll,::~' C 2tnd !::;cht::::dLll!i!.~ D. "[6J, 
c: 1. i::I~5S if i cat.:i. on 0 l' c Ol"pOl~~i t. :i, on!!.:; by t.t"'le F :2:L .. ,ft: .. , v..)i::i~S iiil I ~:l0 i::,l'ilb i gLi(:'US , 
Uncle 'I' t.he [~ .. : ..t.LJj .. ,:,.. 5 C hedLl 1 es , COl" po:) l~ a t. j, on~:; 1 i !5 t.!?cl in" !::; c h€!dul f::.' B' 
wel"e 'depart.mental corpol"ations' l"esponsible fol" admin:i.stl"ative, 
regulatory and supel"visory sel"vices. Schedule C listed 
cOl"porat.ions' which were quasi-commercial corporat.ions, while 
Schedule 0 contained 'proprietary corporations' which were purely 
commercial and did not depend on government appropriations. There 
were also non-scheduled corporations. This ambiguity in 
classification was a source of dissatisfaction to the Office of 
the Comptroller General and the Auditor General.C7J 
The Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accountability (lambert Commission) and the Treasury Board 
Secretariat proffered alternative definitions. The Final Report 
of The Lambert Commission(SJ established three criteria for 
identifying a public corporation. These criteria involve the 
direct delegation of authority. the existence of a board of 
directors and some form of managerial decision-making. Based on 
these criteria, the Commission identified three types of public 
enterprises; those that are wholly-owned by the government; 
shared enterprise in which share equity is jointly owned by the 
government and other participants; and quaSi-public enterprises 
which are non-profit or membership corporations sponsored by the 
government. Although the Commission's criteria for identifying 
public enterprises were useful they were not satisfactory . In 
and the federal government is still a long way from developing an 
identification and data integration package. "[9J 
In response to these shortcomings, the federal government 
int.roduced cH'j ii:,fIH2ndriIE:nt t . .::) trH!~ t:~.~iL .. tL .. in 19::::4. Uncl€~r' U"le 19::::4 
approved by Acts of Parliament. When crown corporations are 
established under the general companies act they will still 
require parliamentary approval. Parliamentary approval is also 
required for the disposal of crown corporations. 
The government will be responsible for broad policy 
directives of all crown corporations. These policies will be 
implemented by a board of directors appointed by the federal 
government and responsible to the government. 
The f~:...a:...0 .... <: 1 ::::1::'::4:> a I !::.o cons i ch,,~ r ed stAb!::; i d i a r i e!:;; 0 f pa r'l~mt 
crown corporations as crown corporations if they are wholly-owned 
by parent crown corporations. These wholly-owned subsidiaries 
will be accountable to the government through their parent crown 
corporations, and may be directed by the government to pursue 
public policy objectives. However, the Act acknowledged that if 
subsidiaries are not wholly-owned by a parent crown corporation, 
then government control would be restricted by the rights of 
other shareholders. 
PI major' dE."pe1r·tt"'!i"'e of thE? '19:::::4. E._: .. l~ ... :.J:t.:._ was tl-',("! n\~'JJ !3cht?dLll~:::s 
of Cl"'OIJJrl cC'j"·pol"'at.ions. Acc()j"'din£J t.o t.hfE.' amE.'ndl"(fE~nt..s, "cr'own 
cOr'poration of a gover'nmental nat.ure would be hencefor't.h gr'ouped 
:in "!3ch£:,c!uIE~ B' of tt-H"', .. E...:.f:i:Pl .... 8:nd bf.:: l"'efEH'rl;?d to ;::1~:. df.~p'E\l~t.r(ii;?ntal 
cOr'porations ... Parent crown corporations of commercial nature 
IJJ:il1 b€~ li~:;t.£-:d in 21 new !:;;c:hf2dule C. "[10] SchedulE.' C :i.~; d:i.vided 
into two par'ts - Part II includes crown corpor'ations operating in 
a compet.it.ive environment not normally dependent on gover'nment 
subvention, such as Canada Development Investment Corporation and 
PetroCanada. Part I includes other crown corporations that are 
dependent on government subvention such as the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, or operate in an environment where 
competition is less severe, for example Canada Post. Some parent 
crown corporations were to be exempted from most provisions of 
on this definition the Treasury Board Secretariat listed 54 
parent crown corporations in 1990. 
The amendments also required the Treasury Board Secretariat 
to provide parliament with an annual consolidated report on all 
the businesses and activities of parent crown corporations. 
For the purpose of this thesis, public enterprises are 
corporations which may be created by Acts of Parliament to meet 
public policy objectives, and they include mixed and joint 
enterprises. Such a definition would include a former mixed 
enterprise, Canada Development Corporation, and Telesat Canada 
which were created by the federal government but were not 
intended to be crown corporations. The definition of public 
enterprises takes into consideration wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of parent public corporations. These subsidiaries should be 
considered federal public enterprises because of the presence of 
federal government interest or control. 
Federal public enterprises also include corporate entities in 
which the federal government has vested interest and control. 
This control is not related solely to the number of shares 
controlled by the federal government but also to the relative 
number of shares controlled by other shareholders and the right 
to appoint members to the board of directors, Distinct from 
government departments, public corporations have board of 
directors appointed by the government to implement broad policy 
obj ec ti \/e~::;, 
The emphasis of the thesis will be on federal public 
enterprises which operate in a commercial or quasi-commercial 
manner and they will normally be listed (or have been listed) 
under Schedule C (Part I) and Schedule C (Part II) of the 1984 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the origins of 
federal public enterprises in Canada by using two broad 
approaches; the political economy and political culture 
approaches, This thesis will attempt to determine which of these 
approaches best explains the emergence of federal public 
enterprises in Canada. As part of the objective, this thesis will 
test these two approaches with respect to selected public 
enterprises and former public enterprises to determine the best 
iapprOEI,ch, 
This thesis will rely mainly on other studies conducted on 
public corporations, government documents, parliamentary debates 
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as well as annual reports of some crown corporations. Though this 
thesis is intended to focus on federal public corporations it is 
also intended to contribute to the literature on public 
corporations as a whole. Most studies of public corporations 
been descriptive - mainly describing the ./ t' 1-' I. L re~a.lonsillp oe~ween 
government and public corporations, and the mechanisms of 
financial and administrative control. Marsha Chandler observed 
this fact when she remarked in 1983 that lithe central analytical 
issues have been the problems of the extent and nature of the 
accountability of crown corporations to government ... exclusive 
reliance on these concerns has led to a number of rather critical 
';;)i:.'tps in ()!.,Ij""' under·st.';;:-tr·lding ()f publ:i.c o'JJner·ship. "[11:1 
Although in recent times the emphasis of the literature is on 
privatization of public enterprises, their origins also deserve 
more attention. An examination of the origins of federal public 
ent.erprises will provide an important framework within which the 
dynamism of public corporations could be understood and studied. 
If an appropriate model for the explanat.ion of the origins of 
federal public enterprises is established, they will be placed in 
a better perspective for an appreciat.ion and evaluat.ion of the 
current privatizat.ion drive. The model could also be a guide tor 
the study of provincial public corporations. For analytical 
purposes, the emphasis of the thesis is federal public 
enterprises corporatIons. This is intended to provide an 
appropriate focal point. to test the political culture and 
1 ;:::: 
political economy approaches. 
Chapter Two of the thesis will provide an overview of the 
size, structure and growth trends of public enterprises in 
Canada, and survey the complex terrain of public corporations 
political economy approaches to the explanation of the emergence 
.. -l ·t 
"t t::, ! •.. I f..·:n~ ~11 . plJbl i c enterprises in Canada. This chapter is intended 
to provide an empirical and theoretical overview of the political 
economy and political culture approaches and how they relate to 
the emergence of federal public corporations in general. 
Chapter Four will test the applicability of the political 
economy and political culture approaches to the explanation of 
the origins of selected federal public enterprises and former 
public enterprises. The selected public enterprises include the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canadian National Railways, 
Petro-Canada (now partially privatized), and former public 
enterprises including Polysar Ltd, Canadair, De Havilland and 
Canada Development Corporation. 
The final chapter will summarize the analysis in Chapter 
Four and establish which of the two models, the political culture 
approach or the political economy approach, provides a better 
explanation for the emergence of public enterprises in Canada at 
the federal level. 
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CHAPTER TWO; FEDERAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN CANADA 
Public enterprises play an important role in the Canadian 
economy. both at the federal and provincial level. A study by the 
E c: ()'nom i c CC)Lln c :i, 1 0 'I' C:o:ln~:ld<'~i 'no ted t./·"Ii::l t il t,hf.:~ c o::)n c Ei:Pt. () of pub 1 i c 
ent.erprises is deeply embedded in the fabric of Canadian 
The first. recorded use of public ent.erprises was t.he Board of 
Works established in 1841 When the Unit.ed Province of Canada 
bought the WeIland Canal, the new Board of Works was empowered to 
expand the canal.[2] In 1851, t.he Nova Scot.ia Railways Company's 
first. Annual Report. was released. There were also a couple of 
harbour boards before Confederat.ion. 
Besides this long tradition, public corporations have 
remained an important. policy instrument. for the Canadian 
government and contribute significantly to the economy. Table 2 
importance of government enterprises in Canada. 
that between 1961-75, government enterprises contributed an 
average of 23.8 percent of government revenue and accounted for 
an average of 3,1 percent of total employment. 
By 1983, total employment for government enterprises had 
increased from 3.1 percent in 1975 to about five percent .Some 
sectors of the economy were dominat.ed by government enterprises. 
TAE:LE 2 
Year As Proportion As Proportion As Proportion As Proportion 
of PIJi:::. 1. :1, c: 
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In the transportation sector, government enterprises employed 
about 38 percent of the labour force and accounted for 48 percent 
of total assets. In the electrical power industry, public 
enterprises accounted for about 80 percent of total employment 
and about 94 percent of total assets.[4J Government owned and 
controlled enterprises accounted for 26% of the net fixed assets 
(including inventories) of all Canadian corporations in 1988.[5J 
In 1984, four wholly-owned federal government corporations 
were listed among the 50 top non-financial firms ranked by the 
Financial Post.[6J. In 1988, A. R. Vining and R. Botterell 
identified 283 provinCial crown corporations, and John Langford 
and Kenneth Huffman also identified 454 federal crown 
corporations.[7J. Based on this information there were 687 
federal and provincial crown corporations in 1983. In 1990, the 
Treasury Board identified 365 enterprises which were either 
wholly owned or controlled by the federal government.[8J 
FEDERAL PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: HISTORICAL PATTERN 
After Confederation, one of the foremost objectives of the 
qovernment was to provide infrastructure. In pursuit of that 
objective, the federal government undertook the reconstruction of 
the WeIland Canal. Between 1878 and 1877, a 14 foot canal was 
reconstructed between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. The 
construction of the canal was one of the first major federal 
government enterprises in Canada. However, at the turn of this 
century, this proved inadequate for the volume of traffic, 50 in 
1913, the government began the construction of a 25 foot deep 
WeIland Ship Canal.[9J 
As part of the Confederation package, the federal government 
was obliged to construct a railway to link central Canada to the 
Maritime provinces.[lOJ Before the construction of the 
Intercolonial Railway. the federal government assumed the assets 
and liabilities of all railway corporations in the Maritime 
Provinces. Subsequently, in 1873, the Prince Edward Island 
Railway came under federal government ownership when Prince 
Edward Island entered Confederation. 
As part of a larqer scheme to unite the new nation, the 
federal government offered an incentive package involving land 
and financial grants to encourage private investors to undertake 
the construction of railways to link the west to the east. 
By the first decade of the twentieth century. Canadian 
Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern had 
responded to government incentives, and constructed a 
nation-wide railroad network. Partly as a result of the first 
world war and the consequent economic decline, all the companies, 
except Canadian Pacific, were plunged into financial and 
operational difficulties verging on bankruptcy. Partly in 
response to these developments, the government nationalized and 
merged the Grand Trunk Pacific, Grand Trunk and Canadian Northern 
between 1917 and 1919 to form the Canadian National 
Railways.Ell] 
Besides railway transport, a number of harbour commissions 
were established during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. Some of these harbour commissions included the Fraser 
Harbour Commission and Hamilton Harbour Commissioners - these 
were established to service the shipping industry.[12] 
When the first world war broke out, the federal government 
established the Imperial Munitions Board (I.M.B.) in 1915. The 
main objectives of the Board were to organize and ensure war time 
production and to allocate contracts for the supply of munitions. 
Under the Imperial Munitions Board a number of factories were 
established to manufacture aircraft and munitions to supplement 
the efforts of the private sector.[]3J However, these factories 
were sold after the war . 
Between 1867 and 1930, federal public corporations were 
concentrated in the transportation infrastructure sector. The 
construction of canals, railways and harbours was intended ~o 
promote and stimulate economic development. The fact that the 
I.M.B. factories were sold after the war may be seen as proof of 
the government's intention to restrict the operations of public 
corporations to the provision of infrastructure and not to engage 
directly in manufacturing activities. 
26 
This period was marked by the Great Depression, World War II 
and post-war reconstruction. A number of public enterprises were 
established by the federal government to meet the demands of the 
The federal government employed public corporations to 
strengthen national unity by establishing nation-building 
institutions to stem American domination. Public corporations 
were also used to complement the private sector in areas where 
private investors were not forthcoming. 
The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, (now Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation', was established in 1932 to provide 
broadcasting services and regulate private firms in the 
industry.[14J In 1937, Trans Canada Airlines (later Air Canada) 
was established, as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Canadian 
National Railways, to improve transportation links within Canada, 
and between Canada and other nations.[15J The CBC and Trans 
Canada Airlines were both established as symbols of nationhood. 
Besides this motivation, both corporations were established "only 
after government failed to interest private investors in the 
Bank of Canada. The government intended to use the Bank of Canada 
to formulate and implement monetary policies to guide the 
national economy.[17J The Canadian Wheat Board was established in 
the 1930s in response to demands by western farmers for 
government protection against market instability and the 
activities of grain elevators. E1S] 
corporations more 
frequently during the second world war than in the entire period 
28 federal crown 
corporations were created. [20J The wartime public corporations 
were made up of administrative and productive corporations. The 
former included Allied War Supplies Corporation, Wartime Oils 
Limited, Fairmount Company Limited and Federal Aircraft Limited. 
The productive corporations included Defence Communication Ltd, 
Polymer Corporation, Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd, Turbo 
Research Ltd and Victoria Aircraft Ltd. 
After the second World War, the objectives for which these 
public corporations were established become obsolete and some 
of them were divested. The War Assets Corporation was established 
after the war to undertake postwar dismantling and privatization 
of the wartime public corporations.E21J While all the 
administrative public corporations were dismantled, the 
productive ones were either privatized or retained. The aircraft 
industry was privatized, but Polymer Limited and Eldorado Mining 
and Refining Ltd were retained as federal public enterprises. 
After the second world war, the objective of the federal 
government was to promote full employment, reconstruct the 
postwar economy and stimulate economic growth to stem the 
reoccurrence of the 1930 depression. Influenced by Keynesian 
economics, the federal government intended to stimulate the 
private sector through discretionary fiscal and monetary 
policies.[22J 
In 1944, banking and financial institutions, such as the 
Industrial Development Bank (later the Federal Business 
Development Bank), and the Export Credit Insurance Corporation 
(later the Export Development Bank), were created to provide 
credit and financial services to the private sector to stimulate 
economic growth and full employment.[23J The Industrial 
Development Bank specialized in the provision of credit services 
to stimulate industrial development, while the Export Credit 
Insurance Corporation provided insurance and financial services 
to Canadian e>~orters. 
As part of the efforts to reconstruct the postwar economy, 
the Wartime Housing Corporation and the Central Mortgage Bank 
were merged to form the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
to address the acute shortage of housing by providing mortgage 
and credit facilities.[24J 
After the war, the federal government was determined to offer 
price support services to primary producers, consequently 
marketing boards including the Agriculture Products Board(1951) 
and the Fisheries Prices Support Board(1944) were 
established. [25J The Canadian Commercial Corporation was also 
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Figure 'i. The Number Of Crown Corporations And Other Corporate Entities 
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the federal public corporations created after 1960 were intended 
to address structural problems, bailout private ventures, save 
or create jobs, ensure a significant Canadian presence in certain 
sectors of the economy or to stem foreign control. Structural 
t: '! . proJ .. ems SUCh as the high degree of non-resident control and lack 
of indigenous capital were partly addressed by the creation of 
Canada Development Corporation and Petro-Canada in the 19705. 
Petro-Canada's operations also addressed regional disparity by 
skewing its exploratory activities to the Atlantic provinces and 
the arctic. 
Employment considerations were important in the decision of 
the federal government to bailout De HaVilland. Cape Breton 
Development Corporation and Canadair Ltd. Though employment in 
all of these corporations declined, some jobs were sustained by 
government ownership. Enterprise Cape Breton was created in 1988, 
in part, to create new job opportunities for displaced miners 
from DEVCO. 
A large number of the public enterprises created after 1960. 
such as Canadair Ltd, Telesat Canada, CDC and Petro-Canada were 
engaged in activities in competition with the private sector, and 
besides serving public policy objectives. they were intended to 
return profits on operations. 
Cape Breton Development Corporation was created in 1967 as 
part of the federal government's efforts to address uneven 
regional development and save Cape Breton from economic decline. 
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According to Roy George "Cape Breton Development Corporation was 
the only federal corporation in Canada whose mandate was the 
economic well being of a geographical area rather than of a 
In 1974, the federal government intervened by buying De 
Havilland to save jobs and promote the development of the 
short-take-off-Ianding aircraft. The federal government also 
bought Canadair Ltd in 1975 to save jobs and sustain the research 
potentials of the aerospace industry.C28] 
The federal government continued to establish public 
corporations to protect primary producers from market 
instability. The Canadian Diary Commission (1966), National Farm 
Products Marketing Board(1970). Canadian Salt Fish Corporation 
(1970) were all established to provide marketing and price 
support services to primary producers.C29] 
After 1960, the federal government began to use mixed 
enterprises as policy instruments. Telesat Canada and the Canada 
Development Corporation were two of the important mixed 
enterprises established after 1960. Telesat Canada is a mixed 
enterprise created by the federal government in 1969 to install 
and operate domestic satellite communication.C30] In the mid 
1960s, some common carriers and the federal government were 
interested in satellite communication because of the possibility 
of enhancing broadcasting and communication services. A 
compromise was struck and Telesat Canada was established, as a 
publicly stated but at least implicit public and private sector 
The Canada Development Corporation was a mixed enterprise 
established by the federal government in 1971 to address the 
problems of foreign ownership in the Canadian economy. [32J A 
mixed enterprise was considered an appropriate means of engaging 
the interests of private investors and ensuring significant 
Canadian presence. 
The Canadian oil and petroleum industry has been dominated 
by American multinationals for a long time. This structural 
weakness was a source of public concern in the 1970s, when the 
oil crisis struck. With declining domestic reserves and the 
insecurity of external supplies, Petro-Canada Ltd was established 
in 1975 by the federal government to address this structural 
In July 1980, the Postmaster General introduced a Bill in 
the House of Commons to make Canada Post, then a government 
a crown corporation. This was intended to streamline 
the operations of postal services in Canada, and ensure financial 
self-sufficiency of the corporation. In response to this bill, 
Canada Post became a crown corporation in 1981 .[34J 
Evidently between 1960 and 1990, federal public corporations 
were more often used to address structural problems such as high 
foreign investments and uneven regional development. The federal 
government also used public enterprises to save some private 
firms from collapse and some sectors of the economy from decline. 
The historical pattern of federal crown corporations, from 
1867 to 1990, reveals a certain trend in the growth of federal 
public corporations. Immediately after Confederation federal 
public corporations were basically instruments for the provision 
of infrastructure. After the 1930 depression federal government 
corporations assumed the responsibility of restoring market 
stability, providing more infrastructure and promoting national 
unity. Since the 1960s, public enterprises have engaged in 
commercial oriented activities, sometimes in competition with the 
private sector, and the use of joint and mixed enterprises have 
also increased. 
ASSETS AND GROWTH TRENDS OF FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATION 
1960-1990 
Figure 2 shows the growth trends of the assets of federal 
public corporations over the last three decades. In using Figure 
3 to assess the growth trends of the assets of federal Qovernment 
enterprises, it IS important to note that inflationary trends 
also account for a large part of the increase in their value, 
especially since 1973. In 1960, the assets of federal public 
corporations were $7.9 billion.[34J By 1970, they had doubled to 
$15.34 billion.[35J From the mid 1970s the assets of federal 
public corporations have been increasing at a faster rate than in 
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In 1973, assets of federal public corporations stood at $19.3 
billion, and increased to about $46.9 billion in 1980.[38J In 
1985. the assets of federal crown corporations reached a peak of 
$62.18 billion.[39J Since 1986 the assets of crown corporations 
have been declining due to the privatization program and 
rationalization by the federal government. In 1986 Nanisivik 
Mines Ltd, CN Route and Canadair Ltd were privatized by the 
government. In 1987, five more federal crown corporations were 
privatized; consequently the assets of federal public 
corporations fell for the first time in 25 years. They fell from 
$62.18 billion in 1985 to $61 billion in 1986. By 1990, the 
assets of federal crown corporations had declined to $52.66 
I;::;i 11 :i.on. [40] 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS OF FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS 
The sector distribution of the assets of federal public 
corporations in Figure 3 shows the importance of federal public 
corporations in certain sectors of the economy. 
About 23 percent of the assets in the transportation sector 
of the economy in 1986 were accounted for by federal public 
corporations. Evidently federal public corporatiol~s have played a 
significant role in the provision of infl ~structure. The federal 
government is the single biggest investor in the transportation 
~.3 '. Assets Of Federal Crown Corporations As A Proportion Of Total Assets 
For Some Sectors Of The Economy In 1986 
Source: Statistics Canada: Corporation Financial Statistics Catalogue 61 - 207 
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sector of the economy.Some of the enterprises in this sector 
include St. Lawrenl~ Seaway Authority. Canadian National Railway 
and Via Rail. 
Thi~teen percent of the assets in the communication sector 
were accounted for by federal public corporations. However, 
Teleglobe Ltd, one of the important public corporations in this 
sector, has been privatized. The Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and Telesat Canada are some of the important 
government enterprises in this sector. 
In 1986, federal public corporations accounted for about 
eleven percent of the assets in the government services sector. 
Some of the federal public corporations in this sector include 
the Canadian Commercial Corporation and Canadian Patent and 
Development Ltd. Government departments and institutions such as 
Statistics Canada and the Treasury Board Secretariat account for 
the remaining 89 percent. 
Mines, quarries, oil and wells is another sector of the 
economy where federal qovernment enterprises have been 
established. Federal government corporations accounted for about 
seven percent of the assets in the mining sector in 1986. The 
resource sector is normally an enclave for provincial 
governments, so it is noteworthy that seven percent of the assets 
in the sector were accounted for by federal public corporations. 
About eight percent of the assets in the wholesale trading 
sector are accounted for by federal crown corporations. This is 
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the result of the federal government's efforts to stabilize 
prices by establishing marketing boards such as the Canadian 
Wheat Board and Canadian Livestock Feed Board. 
The other sectors shown in Figure 3 include mainly 
manufacturing and electric power. The federal government has the 
least investments in these sectors. In the case of electric 
power, most of the assets are owned by the provincial governments 
and they include companies like Ontario Hydro and Quebec Hydro. 
The federal government investment in the manufacturing sector has 
not been substantial, because the main concern of the government 
has been the provision of infrastructure, leaving the 
manufacturing sector to the private sector . When the federal 
government undertakes manufacturing ventures, it does so either 
because private investors are not forthcoming or to bailout 
private firms. The federal government also undertakes 
manufacturing ventures because of the technological externalities 
they may generate; a case in point is the Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. 
Figure 4 shows the employment trends of federal public 
corporations between 1960 and 1990. In the 1960s, employment 
figures for federal public corporations were relatively stable 
ranging between 132,000 and 136,000. (This variation was mainly 
due to seasonal variation in employment in the transportation 
sector).[41J In 1966 employment figures reached 142,000 due to 
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the increase in employment in almost all federal public 
corporations and the increase in the number of government 
enterprises. 
Figure 4 shows that employment figures declined from 142,000 
in 1966 to 136,000 in 1971 due mainly to about 5,200 lay offs hv 
- I 
the Canadian National Railway System.E42J Rationalization in 
C.N.R. led to a further decrease in employment to about 132,000 
in 1976. 
After 1976, Figure 4 shows that employment began to increase 
again, reaching 157,000 in 1980 due to growth in Petro-Canada, 
Canadair Ltd, De Havilland Aircraft and Freshwater Fish 
Marketing Corporation.C43J There was a sharp decline to 148,000 
in 1981 due to layoffs by C.N.R., Petro-Canada, Air Canada and De 
Havilland.C44l 
In 1983, there was a sharp increase of about 80,000 due to 
the inclusion of Canada Post Corporation In the federal 
government enterprises in 1982. However this increase was partly 
offset by layoffs bv I the C.N.R. and some rationalization within 
Via Rail.C45J 
From a peak of 212,000 in 1985, Figure 4 shows that 
employment figures dropped to 174,000 in 1988, and declined 
further in 1989 to 142,000. This decrease was due to the 
privatization of 19 federal state enterprises since 1982. Some 
of the privatized crown corporations include Canadair Ltd, De 
Havilland, Air Canada, Canadian Arsenals Ltd and Canada 
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Development Corporation.C46] 
In 1990, employment within federal government enterprises 
decreased to 135,000 due to rationalization within Canada Post 
Corporation, Petro-Canada and C.N.R .. 
Compared to the growth trends of assets, it is evident that 
although employment figures have reduced considerably, assets 
have only reduced slightly from the 1985 peak.C47] 
While employment decreased from a peak of 212,000 in 1985 to 
138,000 in 1990, assets dropped from 562.18 billion in 1985 to 
552.66 billion in 1990. Thus, the rationalization and 
privatization of federal public corporations have considerably 
reduced employment within crown corporations. With the exception 
of Air Canada and Canada Development Corporation, most of the 
crown corporations privatized were small in terms of assets, so 
in comparison to employment, assets of public corporations have 
not registered any significant decrease. 
This overview provides an idea of the size, growth trends and 
the nature of federal government enterprises in Canada. For 
analytical purposes, the focus of the review has been on federal 
public enterprises. However, is it important to note that 
government enterprises also play an important role at 
provincial level. Hopefully the results of t.his study 
t.he 
.... i '1 
Ii',} .I. .L •• 
provide an appropriat.e framework for future studies of government 
corporations at. the provincial level. 
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CHAPTER THREF": TWO APPROACHES: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
Various models have emerged in an attempt to e~)laln the 
public enterprises phenomenon in Canada. The political economy 
and political culture approaches are two models that have widely 
been applied to the study of public enterprises in Canada. The 
focus of this chapter is to examine how these two models explain 
the emergence of federal public enterprises. 
Political culture is a set of shared beliefs and attitudes which 
shapes peoples' reactions and perceptions in a political system. 
Gad Horowitz, Seymour Lipset and Herschel Hardin share the view 
that the Canadian political culture, unlike the American, is 
predisposed to the use of public ownership as a policy 
Recurrent themes in Canadian political culture are elitism, 
conservatism, particularism and statism. In contrast, the United 
States is considered to be liberal, integrated, individualistic 
and anti-statist. These characteristics and differences in the 
Canadian and American political culture may provide explanations 
as to why public ownership is more frequently used as a policy 
instrument in Canada than in the United States. 
In his article 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in 
Canada; An Interpretation' ,[2] Horowitz established a 
relationship between the Canadian political culture and public 
ownership in Canada using the 'fragment theory' developed by 
Louis Hartz. According to Hartz, new societies, such as the 
United States, Australia, South Africa and Canada, are fragments 
of old societies in Europe and their founders bore ideas and 
values which did not represent the full spectrum of the ideas or 
values of their mother country. Hartz observed that "when a part 
of a European nation is detached from the whole of it, and hurled 
outward into a new soil, it losses the stimulus toward change 
that the whole provides. It lapses into a kind of immobility".C3J 
Thus, these ideological fragments lacked the dialectical forces 
found in the old societies and were therefore ossified and 
congealed in these new societies. 
Horowitz noted that English Canada, like the United States is 
a 'bourgeois fragment'; however, the United States is a perfect 
bourgeois fragment and a repository of an unsullied liberalism 
and individualism. In the United States the process of frontier 
settlement spawned a brand of liberalism which provided an 
impetus for the American Revolution. Influenced by classical 
Lockean liberalism, American history has been dominated by 
anti-statism, liberalism and laissez-faire ethics. The founding 
fathers of the United States were committed to a government which 
would ensure life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and a 
commitment to the tenet that a government that rules least rules 
best'. This orientation may explain why public ownership is 
less frequently used in the United States than in Canada. 
In contrast, English Canada has a streak of toryism in the 
non-American past, we have tended more to identify liberty with 
procedures rooted in society."[4] Horowitz also observed that 
English Canada has been powerfully shaped by tory values such as 
elitism, ascription and statism which are absent in the United 
the far greater willingness of English Canadian political and 
business elites to use the power of the state for the purpose of 
developing and controlling the economy".[S] 
Horowitz observed that the conservatism of English Canada is 
committed to organic unity, collectivism and particularism, 
eschewing the individualism that characterized American 
liberalism. The collectivism of English Canadian liberalism gave a 
tinge of 'socialism' to English Canada's political culture, but 
it lacked the egalitarianism of 'socialism'. Nevertheless it 
inclined the Canadian political culture to statism. The tory 
streak in English Canada was further strengthened by the American 
Loyalists who had rejected the American Revolution and had 
migrated to Canada. Horowitz noted that English Canadian 
He also observed that because of the elitism and 
particularism of toryism, tinged with socialism, the Canadian 
polity is inclined to use the power of the state to maIntaIn the 
status quo. English Canadian liberalism, according to Horowitz 
intervention in the economy and more tolerant of 'feudal 
In Canada, the French feudal and clerical elites and English 
tories who settled in North America were against the ideas of 
liberty and equality that the French and American Revolutions had 
stood for.The French clerical and feudal elites were committed 
to collectivism and the hierarchical tradition that characterized 
feudal societies. Moreover, they were determined to stem 
anglophone domination; consequently, they were more inclined to 
use the power of the state to preserve their tradition. 
The Family Compact and the Chateau Clique were determined to 
use the state apparatus to preserve their economIc and political 
privileges as well as to promote economic development. Req 
groups saw the need to use the state to protect minority 
cultures'![8J and stimulate economic development. This underlines 
the statism of the Canadian political culture which has 
frequently led to the creation of public enterprises. 
After the rebellion of 1837, French and English Canada formed 
the United Province of Canada in 1840. There was a perceived need 
for communication between French and English Canada, so the Grand 
Trunk Railway was conceived with qovernment assistance in 
1850. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1918, Hon Wilfrid 
Laurier noted that 
i I :i t t./.} ~::t ~:5 f f:.~]. t i on C: i::t 1''', .:::t (:1 c:~ t. t"i 2t t. t i"', t:':':' G r' ~::t r"l fj 
Trunk enterprise could not be carried 
out unless there was government 
assistance. Nobody would find fault 
with the government for having 
initiated the system of government 
assistance .... , everybody realizes 
that unless that assistance had been 
.;;") i 'v't':!n ..... :i. t :i. r:~ que~:::. t i orl;::d:::d E,o "\It"·1\2tht.'~p 
the country itself would have endured 
·:~:,.s .::t ~)c;lit.ic~:{1 E.::rlt.it"/'!.[~.1] 
Even before Confederation, the elites of French and English 
Canada saw the need for state assistance and intervention. 
Statism was accepted by both the French and the English elites as 
a means of binding the Union together and facilitating economic 
development. This statist tradition was cappied over to 
Confederation. Wilfrid Lauriep's statement also suggested that 
the political elites were committed to statism after 
to constpuct a pailroad to link the Maritime ppovinces to central 
Canada. The Act stated that 
if I on <::\~5 ffJtAC i-! i::t~; ti"'!f±= i=tr' C) 'v :i. r)c e~5 () of t ... fCI\/C:i, 
Scotia and New Brunswick have joined 
in a declapation that the construction 
of the Intercolonial railway is 
essential to the consolidation of the 
Union of British North America and 
the assent, there to, of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick and have consequently 
agreed that provision should be made 
for its immediate construction by the 
';;Jovel"nlnent" [1 OJ. 
The statist tradition of the Chateau Clique and the Family 
Compact, which was evident during the Union of Lower and Upper 
construction of the Intercolonial railway was considered 
"essential to the c(:.nsolidation of tt-·,e Union of Brit.ish NorU-, 
America" Thus, public ownel"ship of l"ailr'oads was seen as a 
cohesive instrument binding the Maritime provinces to central 
Canada. 
Canadian policy makers were favourably disposed to the use of 
public enterprises at the very beginning of the nation. However, 
ir1 thE! Unit.ed !:;t2!t.es, Lloyd Musolf nClted that., "it took the 
turbulent twentieth century to provide a major stimulus to public 
enterpl"' i SI?5i" . [ 1 1 J 
In 1932, when the Hon. R.B. Bennett, the Prime Minister and 
leader of the Conservative Party moved the second reading of Bill 
No. 94 establishing the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, 
he stated that "no other scheme than that of public ownership can 
ensure to the people of this country, without regard to class or 
place, fE.'qu211 enjoyment of r'adio bl"oetdcasti ng. "[ 12] 
C"-' 
._"t •• :, 
The Prime Minister's statement illustrated the cultural 
disposition of policy makers in Canada to use public ownership. 
The statement leaves the impression that public ownership was 
the only governing instrument that could guarantee radio 
broadcasting to all the peoples of Canada. Although in recent 
times more egalitarian values are permeating the Canadian 
political culture, elitism has not been obliterated and statism 
IS still part of that culture. 
In an address to the Women's and Men's Canadian Club of Ottawa 
-f ""'1 ~. I ; Pierre Trudeau also endorsed the statist tradition of 
the Canadian political culture. He stated that 
sense of that phrase, does not exist in 
Canada. I have said that we have not 
been able to make even a modified free 
market system work ..... We have not had 
a free economy in Canada, but a mixed 
I.'::.'conr::;.rny" . I: 1 :3] 
Trudeau's statement reflected once again the disposition of the 
Canadian elite to big government and public ownership. His 
statement that a modified free market has not been possible in 
Canada, suggests a deposition on the part of the political elites 
to intervene and sometimes use public ownership. Hardin has also 
country ... Americans have, or at least had, a genius for private 
enterprise; Canadians have a genius for public enterprise."1:14J 
Horowitz noted that in Canada all political parties are 
inclined to statism. The Conservative Party is the champion of 
toryism; although committed to 'business liberalism', it has 
traditionally shown a paternalistic concern for the people and 
the nation, which is sometimes expressed in state intervention 
and the creation of public enterprises. The tory touch of English 
Canada's liberalism has given impetus to social democratic 
parties such as the CCF/NDP, which are committed to state 
intervention. And the Liberal Party, influenced by socialism and 
lacking the monolithic individualism of American liberalism, is 
also committed to statism. Horowitz cited the increased role of 
the state when the Conservative Party under the leadership of 
Bennett and the Liberal Party under King held power to 
corroborate hIS assertion that parties of all shades in Canada 
have been committed to statism and public ownership. 
This disposition towards 'big government' or public ownership 
is not limited to the elites. Canadians in general have 
traditionally been more inclined to big government than 
Americans. A Gallup poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of 
Public Opinion [153 on the state and the economy between 1938 and 
1942, showed that Canadians are more favourably disposed to 
public ownership than Americans. 
While only 45 percent of the respondents objected to 
government ownership in Canada, 70 percent objected in the United 
States. This demonstrated that Canadians are more inclined to 
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it would be a good idea for the government to run all industries 
that handle and distribute certain necessities of 1ife- like 
No i.)ncii''''C :i, dE~d 
ir'! f'::1vOI,J'r 
N,.,t.:i,()ni:ll T()t2', 1 
t.hink the government. 
should operate all, some, or none of t.he factories producing the 
'! 4, :3~~, 
Don't. know or depends 12,0% 
public ownership and big government than Americans. It must be 
noted, however, that the polling data were compiled at different 
times and the questions asked were different, but they still 
reflected the attitudes of Canadians and Americans to 'big 
government' . 
A recent poll conducted in 1968 by the Canadian Institute of 
Public Opinion support the evidence that Canadians are more 
favourably disposed to 'big government' than Americans. The 
results of the polls, depicted in Table 4, show that while only 
23 percent of the Canadian respondents considered 'big 
government' a threat in the future, 46 percent of the American 
respondents felt the same too. (see Table 4) 
In the mid 1970s, Stephen Arnold and Douglas Tigert [16J 
appraised some empirical data to assess the similarities or 
differences between Americans and Canadians. One of the areas 
surveyed by the study was American and Canadian attitudes towards 
collectivism and individualism. Table 5 shows the personality 
items used in assessing public orientation towards individualism 
and collectivism in both countries. Table 5 reveals that 
Canadians are more disposed to big government than Amerlcans and 
would readily condone government intervention. Due to Canadian 
attitudes towards big government, they are more likely to favour 
government intervention than Americans. This may explain publ1C 
ownership of radio broadcasting and air carrier services in 
Canada, while in the United States private ownership with 
Canadians and Americans were asked "In your opinion which of 
the following will be the biggest threat for this country 
B:i.~:;j L. iEl bOLl 1" 
100% 1 o:::n~::!:: 
* Some named more than two threats 
Opinion, January 11. 1969 
government regulation was the desired policy instrument. 
Conservatism is another recurrent theme in the Canadian 
political culture which may have influenced the creation of 
public enterprises. Writing on Canadian conservatism, Seymour 
Lipset noted that "the stronger conservative orientation north of 
the border historically has meant a larger role of the state in 
the Canadian economy".(17] Horowitz shares the same view when he 
st;;:'lted th~_'tt Canadian cc.nservat.ism "has .:\ tr.:.uch of tl"i:.'tdi t.ional 
tOl~y aLlra, tradj.t.ictllalism, a s~t.rong st.ate ~"nd so o:,n. H(18] Due t.o 
the rejection of individualism by Canadian conservatism, the 
commit.ment t.o organic unit.y and a paternalist.ic orientation, 
Canadian policy makers have more frequently used public 
enterprises than the United States. 
It has been suggested that because Canadians are 
consel"vative and risk averters, they are less likely t.o develop a 
vigorous private sector, consequent.ly public enterprises have 
increasingly been established to fill the gaps left by the 
private sector. Seymour Lipset has suggested that "if Canadians 
are more conservative in t.heir behaviour in the private sector, 
they have been much more pl"one t.o rely on the stat.e t.o handle 
econol'rlic Etnd ot.hel~ r(l~ltter's." (19] 
In 1974, the Science Council of Canada also concluded that 
Canadians avoid risk and are less likely to undertake new 
ventl,lr-es. The COI .. /llC i 1 not.ed thElt "C.:tnadians hc:tve one of t.he 
highest. l"ate of savings in any count.r-y in the wor-ld, ... but. t.end 
59 
PERSONALITY ITEMS 1'1EJ~N L.EVEL OF 
The government in Ottawa (Washington) 
is too big and powerful 40 
The government should guarantee 
everyone at least $3,000 per 
year whether he works or not 
Communism is the greatest peril in 
the world today (M) 
0= Definitely Disagree; 20= Generally Disagree; 40= Moderately 
Disagree; 60 = Moderately Agree; 80= Generally Agree; 100= 
D,:,::, f i "("'f:i. t..t::,']' y (.'~I';;;) r' E,'I,:::: : .:: 1'1) = !V!."I ~;?s ()'(', 1 Y 
* Differences is statistically significant at 0.001 level 
Source: Arnold, ~, and Tigert, D, 'Canadians and 
60 
consistently to avoid offering encouragement to entrepreneurs 
with new technology-based products: as a nation we avoid this 
Partly because they avoid this kind of business risk, 
Canadians have not been able to provide the entrepreneurial zest 
necessary to harness the innovativeness exhibited in Canada. It is 
the view of Hardin that the way the Canadian colony was settled 
may have precluded the development of entrepreneurship in Canada. 
He notes that "the Canadian dialectic never allowed a dynamic 
free enterprise culture to take hold at the centre of the 
country's life."[21J For e>~mple. in 1885 Tom Montgomery built an 
automobile in Sarnia, other Canadians followed his example and 
built automobiles, but this did not foster an indigenous 
some interesting bouncIng about and experimentation during the 
the Canadian automobile industry settled down .L ... ~., :, • .1 
also noted that "with few exceptions, private enterprise culture 
in Canada has been a feeble generator of the kind of 
entrepreneurial zest that marks a dynamic modern society off 
Thus, the Canadian private sector has not been vibrant as the 
the private sector in the United States. The lack of 
entrepreneurship has led to a situation where the government is 
increasingly called upon to assume some of the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities, this has sometimes meant the creation of public 
enterprises. According to Hardin public enterprises such as the 
CNR, Polysar Ltd. and Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. filled a vacuum 
in Canadian entrepreneurship by taking innovative ventures in the 
course of their operations. [24J Public enterprise is a practical 
expression of Canadian entrepreneurship. In contrast to Canada, 
the American ethic of laissez-faire liberalism and individualism 
spawned an entrepreneurial zest which require less government 
support. 
Partly because of the weakness of the private sector, the 
state is unable to interest the private sector in undertaking or 
sustaining certain economic ventures which are considered 
essential. Consequently. public enterprises have been created to 
fill the gaps left by the private sector. Cases in point are Air 
Canada Ltd, Consolidated Computer Inc .• Fisheries Products 
International and Canadair Ltd., all former federal crown 
corporations which were created, in part, because of the failure 
of the private sector.Hardin has suggested that the Canadian 
public enterprise culture has been influenced by three sets of 
contradictions; "1) French Canada as against English Canada; 2) 
The region as against the federal centre; 3) Canada as against 
the U.S .. "[25J According to Hardin, it is within these 
contradictions that Canada has defined itself. Within these 
contradictory and centrifugal forces, Canada has consistently 
worked towards integration. national identity and national unity. 
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sometimes by creating public enterprises with nation-building 
The first set of contradictions - the dualism between French 
and English Canada has always been a part of the Canadian 
political culture. Section 133 of the Constitution Act of 1867 
. .... -.-......... -.... -...... -...... -.-.. -.......... ~ ............. -............... --..... -.......... --................. . 
guaranteed the use of French and English in Canada. This dualism 
In Section 16 of 
Confederation was an attempt to unite English and French 
Canada together as well as preserve the culture of French 
Canada. This dual motive of unity and preservation has been the 
focus of the contradiction between French and English Canada. It 
is the objective of the federal government to preserve the 
distinct French culture as well as integrate it into mainstream 
Canadian culture. On the other hand, Quebec is determined to 
preserve the French culture, sometimes with threat of secession 
and at other times with preemptive measures to stem anglophone 
domination. These preemptive measures have sometimes involved the 
creation of public enterprises to stimulate economic development. 
The 'Quiet Revolution' in Quebec was an attempt by the provincial 
government to ensure the survival of the French culture and prop 
up the fledgling Quebec bourgeoisie. This was part of the 
motivation underlying the creation of a number of public 
enterprises including SOQUIP, SOQUEM and SIDBEC. 
At the federal level, nation-building institutions such as 
Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission and Trans Canada Airlines 
cohesive instruments partly intended to weld English and 
French Canada together. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is 
of particular interest, since it was intended to broadcast in 
Lapointe, a member of the Liberal opposition, from Quebec East 
stated that "I have been supporting this principle from the 
first, more particularly after the work of the Aird 
Commission .... l congratulate the house for having the Bill 
introduced."[26J Thus in spite of the contradiction between 
French and English Canada, the member from Quebec supported the 
bill to create the CBC, since it would be transmitting in French 
and English and ensuring a place for French culture in a 
predominantly English Canada. CRBC was a reflection of the 
dualism in Canada. it was intended to attenuate the centrifugal 
forces of dualism as well as endorse the inherent dualism by 
broadcasting in English and French. Perhaps, it is only through 
public ownership that dualism and unity could simultaneously find 
In Canada, the contradiction between the regions and the 
centre, according to Hardin, has sometimes led to state 
intervention and the creation of public enterprises.[27J 
Confederation was an attempt to bring the Atlantic colonies and 
into a federal system as well as preserve their 
distinct regional characteristics. Although the Maritime 
provinces, - Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, 
- joined Confederation voluntarily, they were not enthusiastic. 
Newfoundland did not join Confederation until after World War II. 
In the west an Act of Parliament established Manitoba in 1870. 
Alberta and Saskatchewan were created in 1905. 
The ethnic composition of these provinces, the process of 
settlement and the way they were brought into Confederation have 
fostered distinct political orientations and cultures that have 
set them apart. In the Maritime provinces, persistent economic 
depression, economic marginalization and out-migration have 
provided the grounds for political discontent and a regional 
political culture. In the west, economic discontent against the 
dominance of central Canada and a mistrust of the central 
government have resulted in alienation. In the context of western 
alienation and the marginalization of the east, distinct regional 
political cultures have emerged and the federal government has 
had to intervene and sometimes create public enterprises with 
nation-building objectives to bind the disparate regions 
together. Due to the contradictions between the regions and the 
centre right after Confederation, the federal government was 
very much concerned with the unity of the nation and acted as a 
centripetal force. The objective of national unity may have 
motivated the founding fathers of Confederation to entrench the 
c c'nst.r'uc t. i on 0 f t.r·le Intel"' c 01 on i Etl I"'Et i I WEty in the Con.§t.J ty...t.i on.Jic t 
point of view ... unless the Intercolonial railway has been 
constructed Confederation could not have been established. "[28] 
In spite of the commitment to construct the Intercolonial 
railway, immediately after Confederation, a government committed 
to the revocation of Nova Scotia's entry into Confederation was 
elected in Nova Scotia. 
Although the National Policy may have stimulated economic 
growth in the Maritime provinces, the fishing, forestry and 
agriculture sectors of the economy were not fully integrated into 
the national economy. Thus, although Confederation may have 
integrated the Maritime provinces politically they were not 
economically integrated. This may have contributed to the growth 
of a regional political culture distinct from the rest of Canada. 
One of the main thrusts of the National Policy was to 
encourage the settlement of the prairie provinces and establish 
communication links between the regions and central Canada. The 
subsequent demographic changes that accompanied the settlement of 
the west led to changes in the distribution of the seats in 
parliament. lhe Maritime provinces lost part of their political 
leverage to the west. Gibbins noted that "the settlement of the 
west was occurring at the expense of the Maritime provinces and 
its long term effect would be a diminished role of the Maritimes 
Although some of the settlers In the west were from other 
parts of Canada, most of the migrants were from the United States 
and Europe and did not have much in common with the rest of 
Canada. The diverse origins of the migrants cast the west in a 
multicultural setting in contrast to the dualism of the rest of 
Canada. The diverse elements of the west were bound together by 
the wheat economy. Gibbins noted that "the wheat economy 
facilitated the political integration of the prairie west and set 
the region apart from the rest of Canada. "[30] 
Communication between the west and the east was considered an 
important cohesive instrument. When British Columbia joined 
Confederation in 1871. the federal government promised to link 
British Columbia to the east. so the government supported the 
construction of the Canadian Pacific. The government also 
supported the construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific and the 
Canadian Northern to strengthen the bonds between the centre and 
the regions. In 1904 the government began the construction of the 
National Transcontinental railway to link Moncton to Winnipeg. 
Regional discontent in the west was first directed against 
the tariff system of the National Policy. The farmers were also 
against the near monopoly power of grain elevators, Canadian 
Pacific Railway and chartered banks controlled from central 
Canada. The encouragement of the Canadian Northern was partly 
intended to appease disgruntled farmers in the west. The prairie 
provinces also resented the institution of party discipline which 
impelled representatives from the west to toe party lines rather 
than serve regional interests. This economic and political 
discontent stimulated an alienated regional political culture 
which was sometimes translated into the formation of regional 
political parties such as the Cooperation Commonwealth Federation 
(later the NDP), United Farmers of Alberta and Social Credit to 
articulate reqional interest and challenge the national 
government. The Farm Credit Corporation (1927) and the Canadian 
Wheat Board(193S) were created partly to appease regional 
discontent in the west and reduce regional mistrust of the 
federal government 
Political and economic discontent in the Maritime provinces 
in the 1920s provided the impetus for the formation of the 
Maritime Rights Movement, demanding better terms for the 
Maritimes provinces. In the interwar years, two important federal 
public enterprises were created by the federal government. In 
1932 the government created a national radio broadcasting service 
- Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission. According to the Prime 
Minister "a radio broadcasting controlled and operated in this 
way can serve as a dependable link in a chain of empire 
communication by which we may be more closely united one with 
the other."[31J He also noted that public ownership of radio 
broadcasting will meet the needs of people of all classes in 
every part of Canada. This reflects the paternalistic concern for 
regions and its people. It is also evident that one of the 
objectives which motivated the creation of the CRBC was national 
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unity and the need to foster closer ties between the distinct 
regions of Canada. In 1937 Trans Canada Airlines was also created 
by the federal government with nation-building objectives. 
TransCanada Airlines was intended to provide cargo and freight 
services between major centres in Canada and serve as a symbol of 
In splte of the attempts of the federal government to foster 
closer ties between the centre and the regions by creating 
public enterprises with nation-building objectives, regional 
differences still perSist. Simeon and Elkins contended that there 
are still variations in provincial political orientation and 
culture. Using data collected in 1965, 1968 and 1974, Simeon and 
Elkins assessed provincial orientation towards political 
efficacy. political trust and involvement. They concluded that 
there was significant provincial variation in political culture 
and orientation. [32J 
This variation in political culture and orientation between 
the regions may have motivated the creation of a mixed 
enterprise, Telesat Canada, in 1968. Admittedly, there were other 
motives underlying the creation of Telesat Canada, but national 
unity also influenced the decision of the federal government. 
! I ~) r' () \./ :i c1 {:.:.:;. . . .~; ~.::.I r' V' :i. r.: {:.::I t.- C: t.. !-.~ t~.:; 1"1 C) r- t t·,! c:l rl Ij 
underdeveloped regions to bring those 
areas into mainstream Canadian life 
and a supplementary service to the 
existing east-west microwave network 
.... Once in operation the domestic 
satellite communication will constitute 
a project of which all Canadians will 
be pl"'oud." [::;:::3] 
Thus, Telesat was not only a symbol of nationhood, it was also 
intended to foster closer ties amongst the regions and the 
centre. The federal government's attempt to foster closer ties 
between the centre and the regions was evident in a speech 
delivered to the Canadian Club in Ottawa in 1976 by Pierre 
Trudeau, he noted that 
"every reasonable person now recognize 
the duty of the federal government to 
manage the country's economy in the 
interest of all its people and its 
regions. The duty carries with it the 
consequent responsibility to intervene 
when necessary to stimUlate employment, 
[and] redistribute income".[34] 
His statement reflected the paternalistic concern of the federal 
government to manage the economy in the interest of all the 
regions to establish closer bounds between them. This has 
characterized the federal government's attitude towards the 
regions. Meanwhile the regions' attempts to assert their 
independence has sometimes led to the creation of public 
enterprises at the provincial level. This was the case in the 
1960s when most of the provinces created public enterprises such 
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as, the Alberta Energy Corporation. British Columbia Petroleum 
Corporation, SOQUIP and Saskatchewan Oil and Gas Corporation. 
Through these public enterprises the provinces were able to 
formulate their own economic policies in spite of the federal 
government. 
In recent times there is no evidence to suggest that federal 
public enterprises have been created to reduce the contradictions 
between the centre and the regions. Other policy instruments, 
such as first Ministers' Conferences, constitutional talks and 
the attempts to eliminate intra-provincial barriers, have become 
the desired POlICY instruments intended to foster closer ties 
between the centre and the regions. 
Hardin's third contradiction involves the l~ited States and 
Canada. The federal government, according to Hardin, has 
frequently intervened to address the contradiction between the 
United States and Canada. American attempts to absorb Canada 
since the War of Independence has fuelled nationalist and 
anti-American sentiments in Canada. The United Empire Loyalist 
who fled to Canada, according to Gibbins, were anti-Amercian 
Americans who "helped put in place the cornerstone of Canadian 
nationalism. "[35l The War of 1812 also fuelled anti- American 
sentiments in Canada. 
After Confederation, American military threats declined but 
the idea of 'manifest destiny' provided a philosophical basis for 
Americans to reject an independent Canada. consequently. there 
71 
was a deep seated feeling in Canada to establish an independent 
nation. Hardin has suggested that "national independence being a 
The collective quest for national independence influenced the 
construction of the Intercolonial railroad. The National Policy 
was influenced by Canadian nationalism and the need to stem 
American influence and domination. The National Policy imposed 
tariffs on imports from the United States to stimulate 
industrial growth in Canada. It also encouraged the settlement of 
the west to prevent the American frontier from encroaching on the 
Canadian frontier in the west. The government provided incentives 
for private companies to construct railway lines on a east-west 
axis to stem the north-south pull. This led to the construction 
of the Canadian Pacific, Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian 
Northern by the private sector. In 1904 the government began the 
construction of the National Transcontinental railway as part of 
a broader objective to unite Canada together. 
At the turn of the century Canada became mOre concerned about 
twentieth century unfolded Canadian fears of absorption were 
replaced by anxieties over the growing American presence within 
Canada."[37J This growing concern spurred Canadian nationalism 
which is sometimes streaked with anti-American sentiments. [38J 
In the interwar years Canadians were particularly concerned 
about American domination of radio broadcasting and air carrier 
services. In the case of radio broadcasting, Frank Foster noted 
that in the late 19205 "Americans had gained the upper hand by 
serving Canada .... Rather than acknowledging Canadian sovereignty 
within Canadian borders, American broadcasters were saying that, 
for radio broadcasting the border did not exist. "[39l American 
domination of radio broadcasting was hindering the development of 
indigenous Canadian broadcasting services. Moreover, American 
domination of radio broadcasting was stifling the growth ot a 
Canadian cultural identity. Consequently. in response to the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, the 
Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission was created in 1932 with 
cultural and nation-building objectives. 
Trans Canada Airlines was another public enterprises which 
nation-building objectives created in 1937. American domination 
of air carrier services in Canada partly motivated the creation 
of the Trans Canada Airlines. According to Garth Stevenson, part 
of the motivation for the creation of the TCA was "to link the 
scattered regions of Canada together and to do 50 without 
reliance on the United States. "[40] Langford also noted that the 
pressure to create TCA partly came from "the expansionary 
tendencies of private American airlines."[41] Thus, both 
Stevenson and Langford acknowledged that the presence of the 
United States and threat of American domination partly motivated 
the creation of TCA. The proximity of the United States and the 
threats of domination have influenced the choice of policy 
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instrument in Canada. According to Hardin, Canada "is a defensive 
reaction against the United States."[42J 
In the post war era, the concern about the growth of American 
investment and technology sometimes stirred anti-American 
sentiments. The intense sense of cultural nationalism directed 
against the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s led 
to the creation of the Canada Council in 1957 and Canadian 
Radio-Television Commission (now Canadian Radio-Television and 
Communication Commission) in 1968.The Canada Council was intended 
to promote Canadian culture and scholarship while the Canadian 
Radio-Television Commission was intended to regulate the content 
of radio and television broadcast and ensure significant Canadian 
content. 
Gallup polls conducted by the Canadian Institute Of Public 
Opinion to assess Canadian views on the American presence, 
revealed that more Canadians were concerned about the American 
presence in the late 1960s and early 1970s than in the 1950s. (see 
Table 6) The results of the polls showed that, while 27 percent 
of the respondents felt that the American influence was too much 
in 1956. 53 percent felt the same way in 1966 and 57 percent in 
1974. The results of the polls may support the suggestion that, 
since the 1960s, nationalist sentiments and anti-American 
feelings in Canada have been increasing. In a survey of public 
opinions polls on American-Canadian relations in the 1970s. 
ND NOT UNDECIDED 
INFLUENCE 1"1 UC 1"""1 
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Source: The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 
Sigler and Goresky suggested that "nationalist feeling among many 
English-speaking Canadians is closely tied to a negative reaction 
to American cultural and economic penetration. "[43] The federal 
government attempt to meet the demands of nationalist sentiments 
and address the overwhelming American influence, sometimes took 
the form of state intervention and the creation of publIc 
enterprises. 
In 1971 the federal government created the Canada Development 
Corporation(CDC) in response to demands by some nationalists that 
some form of government intervention was required to address the 
high degree of foreign control, especially American control, In 
Canada. Writing on the CDC, Stephen Brooks noted that "economic 
nationalists viewed it as a necessary part of a broader policy 
of repatriating economic decision-making."[44J The rise of 
economic nationalism in the 1970s may have contributed to the 
decision of the Liberal government to establish the CDC. 
The Foreign Investment Review Agency (now Investment Canada ) 
was created in 1974 to screen and regulate foreign direct 
investment in Canada. The creation of the FIRA may have been 
influenced by the upsurge of nationalist sentiments and the 
desire to preempt further American control of the Canadian 
economy. 
The Canadianization drive in the 1970s led to the creation 
of PetroCanada(197S) and the introduction of the National Energy 
Program in 1980. The NEP was intended to ensure significant 
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Canadian presence in the oil and petroleum industry. In Canada, 
economic nationalism and Canadianization programs are most often 
tinged with some anti-American bias, considering the proximity 
and the overwhelming presence of the United States in Canada. 
It may be suggested that the contradiction between the United 
States and Canada has stirred nationalistic impulses, and 
sometimes anti-American bias, which have been translated into 
state interventionist policies and, sometimes, public enterprises 
with nation-building objectives. 
Hardin observes that these contradictions lead to a 
dialectical process resulting in the creation of public 
enterprises in Canada. He noted that 
"Th,:~' c (),("', t.. r ctd i c t i o'n bf:.'· tv.iE:fE!n t.!·",E? S'i-i"ilct 11 
Canadian market and t.he North American 
continent - is still operative, acting 
~~b~r~re~~e~p:~~~!n~.~~;~~~:e~~eo:t~:~ 
dialect.ics at work, st.emming from the 
contradictions between French and 
English Canadas, and between the 
regions and t.he federal centre. These 
dialectics are also forcing instruments 
of nE!'," pub 1 :i. c: t'!"f"·!tf~rpr· i St:"?~: .. " [4S] 
These contradictions stimulate nationalist sentiments which are 
e~)ressed in the creation of public: enterprises. Hardin points 
.;)ut. th<::.1:. "ti···IE.~ publ:i.c '.::.,'nt.€~r·pr':i.st':! C:Llltur~2 :i.~:; thf,' pr··,;:!cticc:,l 
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POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
State intervention has always been a feature of the 
predominantly laissez-faire economies of western Europe and north 
America. Though the economies of these laissez-faire countries 
are controlled mainly by private capital, public ownership and 
state intervention have been used to facilitate private capital 
accumulation and to secure and maintain the legitimacy of the 
capitalist system. As observed by Leo Panitch, the "capitalist 
state must fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory 
functions - accumulation and legitimization."[47] In Canada the 
fulfillment of these two objectives sometimes entails the use of 
public ownership. 
One of the central themes of the political economy approach 
is class analysis. The issue of class and the state has been the 
subject of intense academic debates and various perspectives have 
emerged [48].This thesis will opt for the structuralist 
approach, which states that the state is 'relatively autonomous' 
from the capitalist class and acts in the interest of all 
factions within the capitalist class and sometimes in the 
interest of subordinate classes to ensure the long-term survival 
of the capitalist system. [49] Public enterprises are one of the 
many policy instruments employed by the state to facilitate 
private capital accumulation by the capitalist class as a whole. 
Sometimes the factions within the capitalist class may have 
contradictory or conflicting goals. Even in these circumstances 
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public enterprises may be established and may serve the interest 
of one fraction against another. 
The origins of public enterprises 1n Canada may have been 
influenced by the nature of the class structure. Niosi shares the 
view that one of the elements underlying the creation of public 
enterprises in Canada is the "levels of development, 
consciousness and organization of each class and each segment 
For example in 1919, when the government decided to 
nationalize the Canadian Northern and Grand Trunk Pacific, it 
considered the interests .. ' .. {: r ••• 1 I various classes.[51] The government 
assumed ownership partly to ensure the credit worthiness of the 
nation. Although the CPR was not nationalized, the 
nationalization of CN served the interests of western grain 
farmers who resented the near monopoly power of the CPR. Thus, 
nationalization served the interests of various classes, 
facilitating private capital accumulation by grain farmers, 
merchants and private interests in railways. Other 
infrastructural projects such as the Intercolonial, National 
Transcontinental and TransCanada Air Lines also facilitated 
. t J ] I' C .~p:l. ... i::l.. <'-" r.: c: Ul"fII.'! .. 0;\ ·i..l cn··, . In the case of Trans Canada Airlines, 
Stevenson has suggested that it served the interest of the 
capitalist class as a whole by complementing the existing 
:i.nfr'i::I.struct.Llr'E.'. CE;2J Leo p,~'tnii:.ci""·1 <::,lso ObSf.-::Y··VEi:d that "!i:;t~:'.t~.::: 
ownership of railroads and utilities and state construction of 
The Great Depression seriously affected wheat farmers in the 
prairies; prices were so low farmers could not meet the cost of 
production. This fuelled political discontent and gave impetus to 
the formation and radicalization of the farmers' movement as well 
as demands on the federal government to address some of the 
effects of the depression, and curtail the domination of the 
wheat economy by chartered banks and grain elevators. The 
government responded to these demands by creating the Farm Credit 
Corporation in 1927 and the Canadian Wheat Board in 1935. 
According to Niosi both public enterprises were established by 
Although post war economic policies were designed to secure 
the lonq-term survival of the capitalist system, they benefited 
some fractions of the capitalist class. Of particular interest 
are the Federal Business Development Bank and the Export 
Development Corporation, all post war public enterprises. The 
Federal Business Development Bank was intended to provide credit 
facilities and business services to small businesses, while the 
ENlort Development Corporation assisted manufacturers to explore 
the export market. 
Sometimes the state undertakes policies that serve the 
interests of subordinate classes in order to ensure the 
legitimacy of the capitalist system and avert social unrest. In 
the 19605, Hawker Siddeley, a British multinational which owned 
DOSCO coal mines in Nova Scotia, was planning to divest its 
operation in Cape Breton, which would have led to the loss of 
6,SOO jobs. The government intervened by nationalizing DEVCO in 
1968, partly to avert the loss of jobs. Bickerton has noted that 
the alternative to nationalization would have been "unprecedented 
social and economic crisis in that part of the country ... the 
attendant social disruption was something that no modern 
government could permit to happen. "ESS]. Nationalization of DEVCO 
was partly a legitimization action to please coal miners in Cape 
Breton. 
Primary producers are one of the well organized groups in 
Canada and have therefore been able to pressure the government in 
designing policies to assist them. The collapse of commodity 
prices in the 19605 impelled the federal government to intervene 
by creating marketing boards, such as the Canadian Diary 
Commission(1966) and the Canadian livestock Feed Board (1966), to 
stabilize incomes of primary producers. According to Niosi the 
funds invested in these marketing boards were "used to maintain 
social and political legitimacy and a certaln level of economic 
activity and employment."ES6] These marketing boards served the 
interests of primary producers as well as the dual objectives of 
accumulation and legitimization. 
Since World War II, American investment in Canada has been 
growing leading to the development of branch plants and an 
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identifiable comprador bourgeoisie. However, because government 
economy. such as insurance, finance, utilities and 
transportation, foreign investment has been d~rected mainly into 
the resource and manufacturing sector. 2ertain fractions of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie in th& manufacturing and resource sectors 
must therefore c~~pete with subsidiaries of American 
multinationa~s as well as deal with takeover bids. Wallace 
Clement noted that the middle- range bourgeoisie is the 
"fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie which frequently uses 
the preservation of its position and 
it is also this fraction which is frequently forced to 'sell 
out I . "[S7:! In the 1960s the nationalist fraction of the 
capitalist class pressured the government to address the high 
degree of foreign investment. In 19S8, The Royal Commission on 
Canada's Economic Prospects chaired by Walter Gordon. a Toronto 
businessman (and subsequently Minister of Finance), proposed the 
establishment of a state-owned venture capital institution to 
reduce the dependency of certain fractions of the bourgeoisie on 
intervention to deal with the issue of foreign investment.ES8] 
Partly in response to these studies and the demands of certain 
factions within the capitalist class, the federal government 
created the CDC in 1971 to provide venture capital for small 
businesses and address the high level of non-resident control. 
In 1974 the government also created the Foreign Investment Review 
Agency (now Investment Canada) to review and regulate direct 
foreign investment in Canada. 
In the 19705, manufacturing interests mostly in central 
Canada were apprehensive of the price and insecurity of oil 
supplies most of which were under foreign control or under the 
control of the regional bourgeoisie in Alberta. Manufacturing 
interests in central Canada were ln favour of a national 
petroleum company, price control and regulation petroleum 
e~)orts. The federal government acted in the interests of 
manufacturing concerns in central Canada and created PetroCanada 
in 1975.[59J The class interests of various fractions within the 
capitalist class have influenced the choice and timing of policy 
instrument employed by the government. 
Another feature of the Canadian political economy which has 
contributed to the emergence of public enterprises is lack of 
private capltal. The argument is not 50 much a total lack of 
private capital, but a lack of private capital to undertake 
long-term industrial ventures and infrastructural projects with 
The staples economy. according to Laux 
Molot, retarded the process of private capital accumulation in 
Naylor argued that Canada's lack of private capital is due to 
the dependency on staples which retarded domestic private capital 
accumulation. He contended that the staples economy and the 
National Policy stimulated the growth of merchant-capital at the 
expense of industrial capital, sInce merchant capital profited 
from intermediating goods rather than taking risky industrial 
ventures. The emphasis on staples and trade, according to Naylor, 
industrial capital accumulation. He maintains .I. L. ..... l. t.J i~::t i ..• 
the surplus appropriation by the metropole, and consequently 
Leo Panitch has also suggested that there is a dearth of 
investment capital in Canada, but he rejected Naylor's 'merchant 
versus industrial capital' thesis [61J. According to Panitch, the 
militancy of Canadian workers. scarcity of labour and the high 
wages coupled with the small Canadian market retarded surplus 
capital accumulation in Canada. lhe crux of both arguments is 
that domestic private capital accumulation was retarded for one 
reason or another. The paucity of private capital has, on several 
occasions, prompted the creation of public enterprises to 
complement the private sector and sustain infrastructural 
projects such as canals and railways. This may explain why 
government reconstructed the Weiland Canals, and created Trans 
Canada Air Lines. Perhaps the government decision to create CDC 
and undertake industrial ventures, such as De Havilland and 
Canadair Ltd, were also due to lack of private capital. 
The staples economy in Canada has sometimes posed problems 
which require some form of government intervention. Government 
attempts to deal with the problems associated with Canada's 
dependency on staples have sometimes led to the creation of 
public enterprises. Canada began as a colony with the main 
purpose of supplying staples to the mother country. These staples 
involved fish, fur, lumber, wheat and non-renewable resources 
which were exported first to France, then to Britain and then to 
the United States, in return for manufactured goods and capital. 
In the context of competition from United States routes and the 
paucity of private capital, the state was particularly involved 
in the provision of infrastructure to facilitate the exports of 
these staples and the imports of manufactured goods. 
State involvement in the construction of infrastructure, 
according to Laux and Molot, took many forms. Sometimes it 
involved public enterprises, such as the Rideau Canal, the 
Intercolonial and the National Transcontinental Railway. At other 
times. the state provided incentives for the private sector to 
undertake these projects, as in the cases of the CPR, Canadian 
Northern and Grand Trunk Pacific. However, if for one reason or 
another, the private sector is unable to sustain these 
infrastructural projects, as in the cases of the Canadian 
Northern and the Grand Trunk Pacific, then the state assumes 
ownership. Transportation links, in terms of railways, were 
particularly important for the staples economy and private 
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capital accumulation. The importance of the Intercolonial 
Railways to the staples economy and private capital accumulation 
was acknowledged by Hon. Colonel Gray in parliamentary debates 
when he noted that "Commercial reasons for building the road were 
much stronger than supposed . Besides the benefit of our 
agriculture and commerce, it could secure commercial courtesy 
from the United States with respect to transport throuqh their 
territory which might be stopped any time."[62J. 
Table 7 compares the trade structure of Canada with other 
industrialized countries. The Table reveals that Canada's export 
of finished manufactured products is relatively less than all 
other seven countries surveyed. In 1955, finished manufactured 
goods accounted for only 11 percent of Canada's export trade 
while the average for the seven countries was about 50 percent. 
(There was a substantial change by 1980). Even in 1980, finished 
manufactured goods accounted for 32 percent of Canada's e~)ort 
trade, while the average for the seven countries was about 55 
percent. Since Canada's exports consist mainly of 
non-manufactured goods, the economy is more vulnerable to price 
instability. According to Laux and Molot, since the staples 
depend on externally determined prices and demand, 
self-sustaining development and autonomy were hindered. This led 
to state intervention and sometimes the creation of public 
enterprises to assert control over the economy. It was also 
necessary for the state to intervene to deal with the booms and 
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busts engendered by the staples economy.C63J In the 19605, the 
collapse of commodity prices posed economic hardship for primary 
producers in Canada. A number of marketing boards, including the 
Canadian Diary Commission, the National Farm Products Marketing 
Board and Canadian Saltfish Corporation, were created by the 
federal government to assist primary producers by stabilizing 
prices and incomes. 
Dependency on staples partly retarded industrial growth in 
Canada. Late industrialization in Canada has also led to active 
state involvement, sometimes leading to the creation of public 
enterprises. According to Laux and Molot. one of the reasons 
underlying the creation of public enterprises in Canada is the 
"pattern of truncated industrialization which makes Canada very 
reliant on foreign capital and technology. "[64J Niosi also shares 
the view that public enterprises emerged in Canada, partly. 
because of "the belated and dependent nature of its industrial 
development."[65J Canada's weak manufacturing system may be 
attributed to the tariff system of the National Policy. The 
fledgling industrial sector of the nineteenth century was 
inadvertently retarded by the emphasis on import substitution 
industrialization. Canadian manufacturers anxious to service the 
domestic market disregarded the international market and borrowed 
American capital and technology. Eventually. Canadian 
manufacturing became dependent on American technology and capital 
and uncompetitive. 
00 
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The data in Table 7 also show the weakness of the 
manufacturing sector and its inability to compete 
internationally. For example in 1980, finished manufactured goods 
made up 59 percent of total imports in Canada, while in Japan it 
was only eleven percent. and in the United States it was 38 
percent. As a consequence of this weakness, the government has 
been compelled to intervene and sometimes assume ownership of 
private enterprises to save them from collapse due to their 
inability to compete at home and abroad. Consolidated Computer 
was bailed out and turned into a mixed enterprise in 1976. 
Fisheries Products International was created as a result of a 
bailout by the federal and Newfoundland provincial governments. 
Niosi has suggested that Canada Development Corporation was 
created partly to support entrepreneurship in Canada because 
industrialization has been delayed and dependent. [66] 
A discussion of the origins of public enterprises in Canada 
must take into account the constellation of political forces and 
party disposition and class interest of political parties. Most 
of the discussions on the emergence of public enterprises in 
Canada have underestimated the role of party disposition, 
electoral support, political alliances in parliament and the 
strength of the opposition. Langford and Huffman did not totally 
refute the influence of party ideology, but they seem to suggest 
that it was not an important consideration in the creation of 
federal public enterprises.[67J Gad Horowitz and Seymour Lipset 
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also seem to suggest. from a political culture approach, that all 
political parties in Canada are inclined to use public ownership 
as a policy instrument.[G8] Contrary to these suggestions, Marsha 
Chandler has suggested that at the provincial level, class 
interest and the disposition of political parties may influence 
the use of public ownership as a policy instrument. Marsha 
Chandler's analysis noted that public enterprises may be 
established to facilitate capital accumulation, serve 
nationalistic objectives or redistribute political and social 
benefits. She suggested that parties of the 'left' are more 
likely to create public enterprises with redistributive 
objectives. while 'non-left' parties are more likely to create 
public enterprises which facilitate capital accumulation.[G9J 
Baxter-Moore also suggests that "contrary to much of the 
conventional wisdom on Canadian public policy, it is apparent 
that party ideology has also had a major influence on the use 01 
the public ownership instrument. "[70] 
At the federal level the major political parties are the 
Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties. 
Traditionally. the Conservative Party supported 'big business' 
and the colonial elites who negotiated Confederation. [71] The 
Party embraces 'business liberalism' which subscribes to the idea 
that government intervention in the economy should be 
minimized.[72] 
The Liberal Party traditionally opposed the elitist 
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tendencies of the Conservative Party. The Liberal Party strikes 
a delicate balance between 'business liberalism' and 'welfare 
liberalism' .[73J Welfare liberalism implies a commitment to 
employ state intervention to address the inequalities of the 
market system by regulating 'big business'. The inclination of 
the Party to use public ownership may depend on which faction 
controls the Party at a point in time. 
Although the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation/New 
Democratic PartyCCCF/NDP) has not formed a government at the 
federal level, the electoral challenge that it poses could 
influence the choice of policy instrument. The CCF/NDP emerged in 
the 1930s, partly, as an expression of farmers' and working class 
discontent against 'big business' and domination by central 
Canada. It is a social democratic party committed to social and 
political equality. and a belief in public ownership as a means 
of achieving social democracy.E74J. 
Given this historical background and the class interest of 
the major political parties, it may be argued that party 
disposition and political forces also influence the choice of 
policy instrument at the federal level. It could be argued that 
the Liberal Party is more likely to use public ownership as a 
policy instrument than the Conservative Party. if the opportunity 
occurs. Although the CCF/NDP has not been in power, it may be 
argued that, should the party form an alliance with either of the 
other parties, there is a more likelihood that public ownership 
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would be employed as a policy instrument. 
After Confederation, John A. Macdonald, the leader of the 
Conservative Party and a firm believer in Confederation, 
constructed the Intercolonial, as part of the Confederation deal. 
When the Liberal Party came to power between 1873 and 1878, it 
tried to construct the Canadian Pacific as a public enterprise, 
subsequently the Conservative Party sponsored it as a private 
enterprise. In 1896 the Liberal Party initiated the construction 
of the National Transcontinental railway. The Liberal Party also 
provided incentives for private capital to construct the Grand 
Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern. The CRBC was created by 
the Conservative Party in 1932. The Party's commitment to 
collectivism and belief in Confederation may have influenced the 
decision of the government to create CRBC. The Party also created 
the Canadian Wheat Board, partly to appease grain farmers in the 
west. 
Except for a brief interlude between 1957 and 1963, and a 
briefer one in 1979-80, the Liberal Party was in power, almost 
all the time, from 1935 to 1984, and incidentally most of the 
federal government corporations were created during this period. 
Perhaps, the Liberal Party's opposition to 'big business' may 
have influenced the decision of the federal government to create 
TransCanada Airlines in 1937. Stevenson has suggested that 
public ownership of TCA may have been influenced by the Liberal 
Party's resentment of CPR's political and economic influence.[75J 
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The Liberal Party's commitment to welfare liberalism may e~)lain 
the use of public ownership as a policy instrument after World 
War II to assist 'small business' in particular and the 
capitalist class in general. Some of these public enterprises 
included the Federal Business Development Bank, Export 
Development Corporation, CDC and PetroCanada. In the case of 
PetroCanada, the idea of a national petroleum company was 
conceived under a Liberal government supported by the NDP in 
1973, and it was established in 1975 by the Liberal government. 
Other regulatory instruments, such as the Foreign Investment 
Review Agency (now Investment Canada) and the National Energy 
Program, were introduced by the Liberal Party. 
The hypothesis that at the federal level the Liberal Party is 
more likely to establish public enterprises than the Conservative 
Party is difficult to test. However, the opposition demonstrated 
by the Conservative Party towards the creation of some public 
enterprises, including CDC and PetroCanada, may suggest that the 
Conservative Party is less in favour of public enterprises.[76J 
Table 8 shows the results of Gallup polls conducted in 1973 on 
whether the government should nationalize energy resources. If we 
presume that the electorates vote for parties that share their 
aspirations, it could be argued that next to the NDP, the Liberal 
Party is more likely to establish public enterprises. While 43 
percent of the respondents who vote for the Conservative Party 
believe that energy resources should be under private ownership. 
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only 38 percent of the Liberal party respondents thought the same 
way too. (The difference between the Progressive Conservative 
and Liberal parties, with respect to the use of public 
enterprises, is not statistically significant). When the 
Conservative Party came to power in 1979, it declared its 
intention to privatize some public enterprises, including 
PetroCanada, De Havilland, Eldorado Ltd ,Canadair Ltd and 
Northern Transportation Company. However, the Party was defeated 
before it had had the time to implement its privatization 
program.[77] When the Liberal Party returned to power in 1980, 
it shelved the privatization program and even introduced the 
National Energy Program to strengthened PetroCanada's 
Canadianization program. When the Conservative Party came to 
power again in 1984, it signed the Western Accord, scraped the 
National Energy Program and deregulated the petroleum industry. 
Moreover the government has privatized some public enterprises, 
including Canadair Ltd, de Havilland Ltd, Air Canada and Canada 
Development Corporation. 
The reaction of both parties to the use of public ownership 
and privatization, especially since the 1970s may support the 
hypothesis that even though both parties may use public ownership 
when the opportunity occurs, the Liberal Party is far more likely 
to use public ownership than the Conservative Party. 
Another factor which has motivated the creation of public 
enterprises is the crisis engendered by the world wars and the 
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TABLE 8: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE NATIONALIZATION OF ENERGY 
,_-,-,R=E§,OURCES 
CANADIANS WERE ASKED "SHOULD THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE 
NATIONALIZED OUR ENERGY RESOURCES, SUCH AS OIL AND GAS, OR DO YOU 
:LHINI< . ...Ef:llVATE ENT~.BPRI:;;E SHOUL£;> STILL CONTROL THEM AS AT PRES!;NT.'!.. 
NATION/~LIZE PRIVATE 
PAr~TY RESOURCES ENTERPRISE (~UAL:£FIED CAN'T !:;AY 
L iben~al VClt.el~s 47 % :;:E! % ,-, ~, % 7 % 
PC Vot.ers 45 % 4::; % 2 % 10 % 
NDP Vot.el~s 69 % 2~'2 % .-:;. . .;) % 6 % 
Inst.it.ut.e of Public Opinion May 16, 1973 
great depression. The first and second world wars posed serious 
problems to the predominately laissez-faire economies of north 
America. In both the United States and Canada, a number of policy 
instruments, including public ownership. were used to reorient 
the economies to meet the war needs. 
Writing on World War II crown corporations in Canada, Borins 
noted that they were motivated by considerations of national 
security, secrecy and security of supply.C78J There were other 
factors besides these motives. Perhaps private capital, which is 
profit-motivated, was unwilling to undertake production to meet 
the war needs because of the uncertainty and risk involved in 
wartime production. The governments in the United States and 
Canada intervened to socialize the cost of production to meet the 
war needs and take over private firms which could not deal with 
the disruption that accompanied the war. The objectives of the 
governments in both countries may have been motivated by the need 
to secure and maintain the survival of the capitalist system. 
Public ownership was used more frequently in Canada than the 
United States during the first world war. The United States 
entered the war in 1917, and the War Industries Board was created 
in 1918; thus, apart from government control of railways, the War 
Industries Board did not have enough time to assume ownership of 
enterprises. However, five Dublic enterprises were created in the 
United States: they included - Emergency Fleet Corporation of 
United States Shipping Board, The U.S. Grain Corporation and 
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Sugar Equalization Board of the Food Administration, War Finance 
Corporation, The U.S. Spruce Production Corporation and the 
Russian Bureau Inc .r79J In Canada, the Imperial Munitions Board 
was established in 1915, and besides other policy instruments, 
seven factories were established.r80J 
World War II increased the role of the state in both the 
l)ni tE~d !;:;t2ItE.~S "H'lel C~:tr1adr.:i. In C2.!n2"!cla, under' thf.'? w'e.:L I"1§'J!i':.§.!d.Ll§.:.2 .... ..f1 .. f: .. 1:. 
the federal government established a number of crown 
corporations, including Defence Communications Ltd, Machinery 
Service Ltd. and Polymer Corporation, as part of a larger program 
to reorient the economy towards the war efforts and to complement 
the private sector. The war time crown corporations in Canada 
were partly motivated by the extenuating circumstances of the 
war. After the war. C.D.Howe observed that "the government has 
no intention of going into business unnecessarily. Occasions have 
arisen in the past where it was important and, I suggest 
i!'(lp\:;:~r·~:\t:j.ve, t.1·",2.!t t 1'''1 E! ';]OvE.''f·nment. I;;;)() ir)t.() bLJ!5il'''lt'E.'ss. "[l;::l:1 Aft.er t.!·"I";:~ 
war. t.he Unit.ed States dismantled some of t.he public ent.erprises 
and others were folded int.o regular depart.ments. Like the Unit.ed 
States, Canada privatized some of the wartime crown corporations 
after the war. but others were retained. 
The 1930 Depression adversely affected the economies of t.he 
Unit.ed Stat.es and Canada and t.hreatened the fabric of the 
capitalist. syst.em as a whole. There was high unemployment., market 
disruption, underutilizat.ion of product.ive capacities and 
shortage of commodities; the market economy failed to meet the 
needs of the society. The legitimacy of the capitalist system was 
in doubt. To secure the legitimacy of the system, interventionist 
policies, sometimes involving public ownership, were used to 
assist disadvantaged groups and to restore market stability in 
the United States and Canada. 
In the United States, the government dealt with the great 
depression by using public ownership and other policy 
instruments. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created 
in 1932 to provide credit facilities to disadvantaged groups. 
Roosevelt's New Deal Program was also a response to the 
depression. Under the New Deal a number of governing instruments 
public enterprises, such as Tennessee Valley Authority, 
W(-E,"('e L!s€~d to address the economic effects of the depression. 
Other financial institutions including the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of Washington and 
Production Credit Corporation were established to extend credit 
facilities.rS2J. Fainsod, Gordon and Palamountain noted that "in 
the United States, with the pressing problems of the Great 
Depression, the federal government created new public enterprises 
programs to ameliorate the effects of the great depreSSion. In 
addition to these programs, the government created the Canadian 
Wheat Board in 1935 in response to demands by farmers' movement 
on the federal government. Government intervention during the 
two World Wars and the great depression were intended to 
socialize the risk involved in production as well as meet the 
legitimization and accumulation function of the state. 
The use of public ownership declined considerably after the 
second world war in the United States. However, a few public 
enterprises such as Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation were retained. Writing on public 
enterprises in the United States after the war, Albert Abel notes 
t.h~:d .. "t.r·le decline in t.he lAse of public corporat.ions by t.he 
federal government. has been mat.ched by an at.t.empt t.o achieve 
similar ends by using private corporat.ions."[84J Thus, t.he Unit.ed 
St.at.es swit.ched t.o using ot.her policy inst.rument.s 
In Canada, public ent.erprises were used to st.imulat.e post. war 
economic reconstruct.ion. Government. financial corporations, 
inc luding t.he.:· Feder'al Bl.lsiness Development. Bank, the E::·::port. 
Development. Bank and t.he Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
were established to stimulate post war economic reconstruction. 
This may reflect the weakness of the private sector and its 
inability t.o deal with the post. war reconstruction. For instance, 
while the synthet.ic rubber plants in the Unit.ed States were sold 
off to t.he private sector, Polymer was ret.ained by the federal 
government, in part because of the lack of private investors to 
aE:~sume ownership. C. D. Howe noted in 194.6 that. "we would be glad 
t.o sell the Polymer Corporation to private industry, if private 
i ndt.-is:. t r'y' vJoul d buy it." [::::.5 J 
Postwar changes in the international political economy 
affected Canada and the United States differently. The role of 
the United States in the post war international political 
economic order was considerably enhanced. But two important 
postwar developments:- increased multinationalization of the 
world economy, and increased international competition,-
significantly affected the Canadian political economy. The 
effects of these developments on Canada were three fold: fir~5t, 
increased international and domestic competition for indigenous 
manufacturers; secondly, the growth of foreign investment, 
especially American investment; and, lastly, trade dependence and 
a branch plant economy with a truncated manufacturing sector. 
These developments were believed to require some form oT 
government intervention, A complex blend of governing 
instruments, including public ownership was employed to address 
these developments. 
World War II stimulated the growth of American companies, so 
after the war there was a large amount of surplus capital in the 
United States in search of investment opportunities. With the 
disruption of the European economies, American companies invested 
most of this capital in Canada. Through this investment, American 
firms took over some existing Canadian firms and established new 
branch plants. Table 9 shows the level of foreign direct 
investment in Canada from 1945 to 1975, United States direct 
'!OO 
Book value in millions of dollars 
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investment increased from 52.3 billion in 1945 to about 532.2 
billion in 1975. An increasing share of the Canadian economy 
coming under foreign control. Some sectors of the economy, such 
as the manufacturing sector, was almost totally under foreign 
control.In 1963 American capital controlled 43.3 percent of the 
manufacturing sector in Canada. In the early 19705 Canadians 
controlled only 34 percent of the manufacturing sector while 
Americans controlled 47 percent.C86] Table 10 shows the levels of 
non-resident control in selected industries in the resource 
sector between 1948 and 1975. In 1975, 74 percent of the 
petroleum and gas industry was controlled by non-residents. In 
the mining and smelting sector non-resident control increased 
from 40 percent in 1948 to 60 percent in 1975. This apparent hlgh 
level of non-resident control was compounded by the activities of 
American subsidiaries. United States parent companies forced 
their subsidiaries in Canada to comply with American laws. For 
example, American laws. such as Trading with the Enemy Act, 
restricted the trading activities of American branch plants in 
Canada. [87J 
In the 19605, the issue of foreign control became an issue of 
national concern and the state sought to ensure a significant 
Canadian presence in certain sectors of the economy. The reaction 
of the federal government to the 1055 of political sovereignty 
and economic dependence sometimes led to the creation of public 
enterprises. Laux and Molot has suggested that the high level of 
I n? ~-
I ndL!~.i t. r'l 
Mining and smelt.ing 40 ~7() i::I(> 
Pet.roleum and gas n/a -1· ... Ii;:;. 7 t.~ 
n/,:, !::I:~:: I~.S 
Source: Adopted from Phillips, P. & Watson, S. 'From 
Mobilization t.o Cont.inentalism: The Canadian 
Economy in the Post-Depression Period', in Cross, 
Toront.o , McClelland and Stewart.,1984 p.40 
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non-resident control may have led to the creation of the CDC.C88] 
Other policy instruments were designed to deal with the 
for example the Foreign Investment Review Agency (now 
Investment Canada) was intended to regulate non-resident 
investment in Canada. In 1971, Edgar Benson, the Minister of 
Finance, noted that "the CDC should be in a position to play an 
important catalytic role in making such constructive changes 
... and reducing the risks of an undesirable degree of foreign 
contr·ol. "[:;:19J ThE:: CDC I,,,i.,!\~:; i:-:tls;o :i.nt.ended t.o enhC:ince thf.;! i:!\bility of 
Canadian-cont.rolled firms to wit.hstand competition domest.ically 
and internationally. In the petroleum indust.ry the government. 
could not. address the high degree of non-resident cont.rol with 
existing regulat.ory instruments, so a national oil company was 
created in 1975. The Minist.er of Energy, Mines and Resources, 
Donald MacDonald, noted t.hat Petro-Canada was intended "to 
increase the Canadian presence in this sector which is of 
. ~. . '!' t lmpOrGance ln assurlng YU ,ure f.",nei~gy sup!=-) 1 :i.es. "[90J ·rhE.~ 
government considered Petro-Canada as one of the many polley 
instruments designed to address the high degree of non-resident 
C()1""'ft.r·ol. 
In 1969, the federal government. est.ablished Telesat. Canada; a 
satellit.e communication net.work, as a mixed ent.erprise. Telesat 
Canada was int.ended to be an inst.rument. of integration wit.h 
technological pot.ent.ial whieh could be harnessed for t.he whole of 
Canada and preempt American dominat.ion, Laux and Molot. not.e t.hat 
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Telesat was created "in the tradition of 'defensive expansionism' 
- satellite communication was deemed critical to national 
integration and preemptive government encouragement was deemed 
necessary to avoid U.S.A. domination."[9]] 
Post war globalization of the world economy posed problems 
to national economies and political sovereignty allover the 
world. Canada, like the rest of the world. is part of a global 
competitive market where state intervention and public ownership 
is common to all participants. However, because of Canada's trade 
structure, weak manufacturing sector and foreign control, public 
ownership was used more frequently than in the United States. 
Increased globalization compels multinational companies 
operating in Canada to restructure production, sometimes, by 
relocating away from Canada. When they do relocate, it is not 
easy to find indigenous capital to replace them. In the resource 
sector, Dominion Steel Company. a British subsidiary which 
operated coal mines in Cape Breton. declared its intention to 
withdraw operations in the mid 1960s.The Nova Scotia and federal 
governments could not interest the private sector in taking over, 
so the federal government assumed ownership of the mines and 
created Cape Breton Development Corporation. 
In the aerospace industry, which is largely controlled by 
non-resident capital, there was an attempt by these 
multinationals to relocate operations in the mid 1970s . Of 
particular interest, were the cases of Canadair Ltd and De 
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Havilland. owned by General Dynamics and Hawker-Siddeley 
respectively. 80th companies declared their intention to relocate 
and withdraw operations in the mid 19705. Government attempts to 
interest the private sector to assume ownership failed so the 
government purchased De Havilland and Canadair in 1974 and 1975 
In Canada, public enterprises such as the Export Development 
Corporation and Canada Commercial Corporation, established after 
World War II have been reorganized in the 19705 to promote the 
export of high technology and capItal goods. The Foreign 
Investment Guarantee Division of the Export Development 
Corporation guarantees foreign investment by Canadian firms. 
These policy instruments were intended to enhance the 
international competItIveness of the Canadian economy in the 
·j'.:0)70s 
Regional disparity is another factor which has motivated the 
t . f ! I . i . . crt:"", .:1.0ri 0" PI"!::'. 1(; cOi~pOri::\:.J.ons In Canada. According to Niosi, 
because of the economic dominance of Ontario, most of the 
provinces undertake policies to "create crown corporations to 
stem the flow of savings, processing activities and centres of 
COi"1ti"'01 tow",r'cls Dr-It.ai"'io."[9:2J Niosi not.eel thEIt. ~:;idbt?c(19f::,::!.) and 
Sysco(1967', in Quebec and Nov", Scotia respect.ively, were 
intended to break Ont.ario's domination of the steel indust.ry. He 
observed t.hat. "the development of provincial crown corporations 
have been part of t.he postwar ",tt.empt at self-defence. "[93J L",ux 
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Person, By Province 1971 and 1981 
(National Average, Canada =100) 
Price Edward Island SO.S 
67.9 6'1.3 
[j'f,t2tr-io '!'!"7. :3 106.S 
':':H). "7 
1 LtC. 0 
British Columbia '! 06. E: 
and Molot have also suggested that uneven regional development 
and the desire of the provincial government to address regional 
disparity and promote economic development have sometimes led to 
the creation of public enterprises.[94J 
Table 11 shows the levels of regional disparity in Can2da 
using the provincial per capita GDP. The Atlantic provinces, 
especially Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, have the lowest 
GDP per person. In 1981 their per capita GDP were, respectively. 
60.6 percent and 62 percent of the national average. In the 
prairie provinces though Manitoba and Saskatchewan have 
relatively low GDP per person at 88.1 percent and 108.8 percent 
respectively. they fared better than the Atlantic provinces and 
Quebec in 1981. Regional disparity has been a source of concern 
to the federal and provincial governments, and various policy 
instruments, including public ownership. have been designed to 
address the problem. However. It must be noted that regional 
disparity has more often led to the creation of provincial public 
corporations than federal public corporations. In the inter-war 
years the federal government created the Farm Credit Corporation 
and the Canada Wheat Board in 1927 and 1935 respectively to 
assist western grain farmers and address regional disparity. Cape 
Breton Development Corporation and Enterprise Cape Breton are 
crown corporations created to stimulate economic development in 
Nova Scotia. DEVCO was intended to sustain the coal industry 
which was the mainstay of the Cape Breton economy, while 
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Enterprise Cape Breton was intended to explore the possibilities 
of diversifying the economy away from coal mining to sustain 
economic development and create job opportunities. The federal 
government invested in Fisheries Products International mainly to 
sustain the fishing industry in the Atlantic provinces to preempt 
further economic decline. 
The operations of other public corporations have also been 
shaped by regional disparity. Petro-Canada's exploration in the 
Atlantic provinces and the Arctic would, to a certain extent, 
bridge the gap between the oil rich west and Atlantic provinces 
and stimulate the growth of a petroleum industry in the east. The 
CNR has also maintained uneconomic routes in the Prairie 
provinces and eastern Canada as part of a larger program to 
address regional disparities. 
This has been an overview of the political culture and 
political economy approaches to the explanation of the origins of 
federal public enterprises in general.The political culture 
approach argues that due to the tory element in Canadian 
ideology, the statist tradition and the commitment to organic 
unity and collectivism, the Canadian polity is predisposed to the 
use of public ownership as a policy instrument. The inherent lack 
of entrepreneurship, has also been advanced, as one of the 
reasons underlying the creation of public enterprises in Canada. 
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Canada, according to Hardin, 1S a reflection of three sets of 
contradictions. These contradictions have stimulated nationalist 
sentiments which, in turn, have been chanelled into the creation 
of public enterprises with nation-building objectives. 
The political economy approach suggests that public 
enterprises have been motivated by the need for the state to 
fulfill the legitimization and accumulation function. Public 
enterprises are intended to serve the interest of capitalism as a 
whole, but sometimes they serve the interests of specific classes 
(or fractions of classes) depending on the constellation of 
political forces. Party ideology and political alliances have 
also influenced the emergence of public enterprises in Canada. 
Lack of private capital to undertake high-risk industrial 
ventures and infrastructural projects with low rates of return 
has also motivated the creation of public enterprises. 
In times of crisis, such as the World Wars and the Great 
Depression, when private capital is unable to deal with the 
crisis, the state intervenes, sometimes by creating public 
enterprises. Regional disparity is another feature of the 
Canadian political economy, which has motivated the creation of 
public enterprises at the provincial and federal level. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ORIGINS OF SELECTED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
The focus of this chapter is to examine how the Canadian 
political economy and the political culture have influenced the 
origins of selected federal government enterprises and former 
public corporations. The selected public corporations include 
Canadian National Railways, Canadian Radio Broadcasting and 
Petro-Canada (partially privatized), and the former public 
corporations include De Havilland, Canadair Ltd., Polymer Ltd. 
and Canada Development Corporation. Although the selection may be 
limited, it provides a good overview of federal government 
enterprises. The range of selected public corporations spans from 
1919 to 1975, and they include corporations in the 
transportation, communication, manufacturing and resource sectors 
of the economy. A mixed enterprise and a wartime public 
corporatlon are also included to broaden the range of the 
selection. This chapter is intended to determine the appropriate 
model for the explanation of the origins of federal public 
corporations in Canada. 
Canadian National Railways was created after World War I by 
the nationalization of Canadian Northern, Grand Trunk, and Grand 
Trunk Pacific, and the incorporation of all other federally-owned 
railway systems. CN is one of the biggest public corporations in 
Canada with assets worth $7 billion in 1990.[1] The federal 
government was forced by circumstances to assume ownership of the 
CN. After Confederation, the federal government was determined to 
integrate the disparate regions together to promote economic 
development and preempt the spill-over of American interest. 
The opening of the west and the fledgling wheat economy made 
it particularly necessary for the construction of railroads tn 
facilitate the transportation of the new staples to central 
Canada for export. The government offered a package of incentives 
involving land grants and loan guarantees to stimulate prIvate 
sector participation in the construction of the railway lines. 
This led to the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
(hereafter CPR). 
At the turn of the century, Canadian Northern and Grand Trunk 
began to extend their railroads to establish connections between 
their eastern and western lines. These developments were largely 
financed by British portfolio investment, guaranteed by the 
federal government. The government also encouraged the 
construction of these extension lines. In 1908, the government 
guaranteed bonds for the Canadian Northern Railways at the rate 
of $13,000 per mile with respect to the 609 miles of raIlway 
lines in the prairie provinces. In 1912 and 1916, the Canadian 
Northern requested government assistance again.[2] 
The Grand Trunk Pacific also requested assistance in the 
form of a loan of $10 million in 1909. In 1914, the Grand Trunk 
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Pacific asked the government to guarantee bonds worth $16 
million. In 1916 the management requested, once again, a loan of 
$6 million.E3J It became apparent that railway construction in 
Canada could not be completed without government assistance. 
Debt-ridden and over-built the railway corporations could not 
survive the economic disruption that accompanied World War I. All 
the railway corporations, except the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
were on the verge of bankruptcy. There were fears in parliament 
that t~e railway companies were a drain on government coffers, 
and it was proposed that the government must take steps to 
resolve permanently the problems associated with railway 
construction and operation in Canada. So in 1916, the government 
established a Royal Commission to study the railway situation in 
Canada and make recommendation to the government. The members of 
the Commission were Mr. A. H. Smith, Chairman of the Commission 
and President of the New York Central Railroad, Sir Henry 
Drayton, Chairman of the Board of Railway Commissioners of 
Canada, and Mr. Acworth, a financial and railway expert from 
England. The members of the Commission had different ideas as to 
how the government should resolve the railway problem in Canada. 
The majority report signed by Drayton and Acworth noted that 
II I f the t,'vvo cornpanil!?'s went int.o 
receivership, we can not doubt that 
investors outside of Canada would 
believe, however erroneously, that 
the Dominion Government had treated 
them badly .... We therefore consider 
that Canada should assume the 
responsibility of seeing that the 
interest of these securities are 
r!"!et. Il [.4] 
Above all else, the Drayton-Acworth report recommended government 
ownership when it proposed that a D~ninion Railway Company be 
incorporated under an Act of Parliament and "that the ownership 
of the Canadian Northern Railways, Grand Trunk and Grand Trunk 
by Mr. A.H. Smith noted that 
" I S;E:!e r',() sa f ~E! cot 1 t.erna! t i ve but. t·h!,"' 
government. shall cont.inue, wit.h 
discriminat.ion, and resort t.o all 
safeguards and under a policy of 
proper regulation ... to aId t.he 
necessit.ous railroads .... until such 
time, which I hope and believe, will 
not. be far dist.ant., when they will 
become self-supporting and t.he 
pr'oblem will bE! solvt::d"[S] 
The members of the Commission differed on the Solut.lon t.o the 
railway problem in Canada. What.ever t.heir differences, it is 
interest.ing to not.e t.hat. the Canadian member of t.he Commission 
endorsed public ownership. while t.he American member rejected 
public ownership. This is probably a reflection of the statist 
tradition of the Canadian elites and their disposit.ion towards 
public ownership. 
In 1917. when the Conservative government decided to act on 
the recommendations of the Drayton-Acworth Report by assuming 
ownership of the Canadian Northern Railways, there were some 
objections in the House of Commons. However. the main objection 
was not p~)lic ownership of the railway system per se, but the 
cost of such ownership and how to insulate a government owned 
railway system from political patronage. Senator Bostock, a 
meulbei"' of t.hf..~ clpposi t..ie,·!'"! not .. ~~d t.hat. "thf:."! 8i 11 plc!ced thE! 
government in a curious posit.ion of arbitrating to discover the 
vc!luE~ of t.hE! Cc,nir.1di':tn Nort.hE!i~n !::;t..ock. "[6J. !::;pE!aking .:::.ri t.he 
Canadian Nort.hern in 1918, Hon. Wilfrid Laurier, t.he leader of 
t.1·"iE~ c'pposi tie'n not.l':?d t.l"·lat. "\J..lhen t.he gOVE!l~nment Pl~opo!sed t.o 
acquire t.he road. I did not object. because I thought. t.he propert.y 
was a good one, t.he only question was as t.o t.he t.erms under which 
j, t. should be .;acql,li j"·€?d. "[7:1 
It. could be inferred, from t.he discussions arising from t.he 
government. decision to assume ownership of t.he raIlway system, 
t.hat. Canadian policy makers were favourably disposed t.o public 
ownership due t.o t.he inherent tradition of st.at.ism. However, 
government. assist.ance and ownership of railway lines is not 
uniquely a Canadian feature. In t.he Unit.ed St.at.es, t.he government 
had provided $90 million of assistance to railway const.ruct.ion 
and operat.ion by April 1918.[8:1 During World War I, the Unit.ed 
Stat.es government. also t.emporarily assumed cont.rol of t.he railway 
system. Thus, government ownership and assistance t.o railway 
construction, during that time, was not uniquely a Canadian 
feature, and cannot be attributed solely to the Canadian 
political culture. 
Nevertheless, Kent Weaver has suggested that ideological 
differences may explain the different reaction of the Canadian 
and American government to public ownership of railways.[9J In 
the United States, while the nationalization of railways was 
discontinued after World War I and a number of railways were 
allowed to go into receivership, in Canada the government 
continued with the nationalization of Grand Trunk after the War 
and did not allow any of the railway corporations to go into 
receivership. 
Other aspects of the Canadian political culture, especlally 
the contradiction between the centre and the regions may have 
influenced the decision of the government to nationalize CN. 
Stevenson has suggested that one of the reasons for the 
nationalization of CN was "to provide railway services to such 
areas, such as northern Manitoba and north western Quebec, that 
have been neglected by private enterprise. "[lOJ In the west, the 
near monopoly power of the CPR and its unwillingness to develop 
branch lines to serve some farming areas was alienating farmers 
in the west. So nationalization may have been influenced by the 
need to appease all these regional interests and bring them 
closer together by sustaining railway linkages between them. As 
Stevenson has suggested. nationalization was a means "of 
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In addition t.o t.hese aspect.s of the Canadian polit.ical 
cult.ure, other polit.ical and economic fact.ors, such as the war 
sit.uat.ion. also influenced t.he decision of t.he government. In 
import.ance of t.he war enabled t.he government to obt.ain t.he 
passage of t.he Canadian Northern legislation."[12J Other t.han 
political culture, t.he federal government was forced by 
circumst.ances to assume ownership of t.he Canadian Nort.hern. In 
1918, t.he Prime Minister, Sir Robert. Borden not.ed that. 
"t.h~", cone! it. i o'n~J i nelLlc t'i:!d by U"II':! ~v':!I),'; tr'tE' 
very great.ly increased cost of fuel, 
mat.erial and labour; ... the inability 
t.o market. securities. .. made it. 
impossible for the Canadian Northern 
Railway Company to complet.e it.s 
undertakings ..... so when the situat.ion 
had t.o be considered by the government 
in 1917 we reached the conclusion t.hat. 
t.he road should be sustained, that 
further aid should be given, but only 
upon condition of acquiring all t.he 
"(' E'l'iI<::! in i n'd c <::IP i t.a 1 !5 t.o c k . " [ 1 :::: J 
Thus t.he economic decline that. accompanied World War I made it. 
difficult. for the Canadian Northern and t.he Grand Trunk t.o 
sust.ain operations. The war was disrupt.ive to private capit.al 
accumulation and government. ownership was lnt.ended t.o, part.ly, 
rect.ify the situation. Speaking on the Canadian Northern in 1918, 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier noted t.hat" I firmly believe that., but for 
t.he war t.hey would have brought the road t.o a satisfactory 
c ornp let i (::.n. II £: '! L!::I 
From the political economy perspective, it could be inferred 
that the decline in immigration that accompanied World War I 
made it particularly difficult for the private sector to sustain 
the operation and construction of a transcontinental railway in 
In Canada the railway companies have had to rely heavily on 
British portfolio investment. The loans were contracted with 
government guarantees, so the government could not allow the 
railway companies to collapse or go into receivership, This could 
have jeopardized Canada's credit worthiness in the London 
financial market. Stevenson shares the view that Canada's credit 
rating would have suffered from the bankruptcy of either CN or 
Grand Trunk.£:lSJ The Economic Council of Canada also noted that 
I!t.ht~ collii:!psE.~ of t.he ffiat.jOl" pl~ivc:'\t.e r'ailw;:,~y fir-ms wOI.Jld 
., .jeopar-dize Canada's credit. rating in t.he foreign capital 
mar-ket."£:16J The Finance Minist.er, Sir Thomas Whit.e, noted in 
1918 that t.he Canadian Norther-n should be sustained to "render 
the maximum of public service in the all-important. fields of 
t.ranspor-tation, and t.hat the credit. of Canada, its provinces, and 
its business enterprises may be protect.ed and maintained in the 
investrner'!t. market.!5 of t.he 'JJol~ld."[·j'7J. :;:;0 t.he final.ncia:!. 
credibility of Canada, as a whole, was an important issue in t.he 
decision of t.he government t.o assume ownership. In this respect, 
nationalizat.ion could be seen as a policy direct.ive t.o serve the 
interest of the capitalist system as a whole, and in partlcular 
the fraction of the capitalist class which depend on the British 
portfolio investment. 
The domestic political situation, especially the formation of 
a Union Government from 1917 to 1921, also influenced the 
decision of the federal government to nationalize Canadian 
Northern. The Union Government of Conservatives and anglophone 
Liberals increased representation from western Canada in the 
cabinet. Articulating the interests of prairie farmers, the 
western representatives were in favour of public ownership to 
curtail the near monopoly power of the CPR in the west. The 
composition of the Union Government influenced the decision of 
the government to nationalize Canadian Northern.[18J 
The class interests of other fractions of the capitalist 
class were met by the nationalization of CN. According to Kent 
Weaver !'in creating the CNR, federal decisionmakers carefully 
protected the fundamental interests of all grouPs."[19J 
Nationalization guaranteed railway services at competitive prlces 
for shippers. Private interests in Canadian Northern and Grand 
Trunk recovered some of their investment. Perhaps, to appease 
Montreal banking interests, the CPR was not nationalized. In the 
west, the interests of farmers' groups, such as Saskatchewan 
Grain Association, were met by nationalization. Thus, public 
ownership provided an atmosphere conducive for private capital 
accumulation and served the interests of various fractions within 
the capitalist class and independent commodity producers in the 
west. 
The need to sustain private capital accumulation was taken 
into consideration when Sir Thomas White, the Finance Minister 
noted that, should the railway system collapse, "then the grain 
and other agriculture commodities, and manufactured products of 
Canada cannot go forward to their destinations and the whole 
trade of Canada, in every part of the country is immediately 
affected."[20J. Thus public ownership was intended to stimulate 
economic growth and private capital accumulation. Once 
incorporated as a public corporation, CN became an instrument of 
national integration and economic development. Its operations 
were influenced by both the Canadian political culture and 
1 . -I' 1 po. IGlca. economy. The nationalization of the CN was influenced 
by the Canadian political economy and political culture. As 
Stevenson has suggested, the nationalization of CN "cannot be 
attributed to a single decision or any single motive."[21J The 
statist tradition and the ideological orientation of the Canadian 
political culture, the contradiction between the centre and the 
regions and the commitment to organic unity may have influenced 
the decision of the federal government to nationalize Canadian 
Northern. 
The nature of the domestic political economy, especially the 
effects of the war on railway construction, the alignment of 
political forces, the interests of the capitalist class and 
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independent commodity producers as well as the capitalist system 
as a whole were taken into consideration in the decision to 
nationalize Canadian Northern. Perhaps the political and economic 
conditions were a stronger motivation in the timing and creation 
of CN, since the United States government was also involved in 
the operations of railways at the time. Public ownership of the 
Canadian Northern was motivated by the political and economy 
conditions compounded by the political culture. 
CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
The nature of the Canadian political economy and the political 
culture influenced the creation of the Canadian Radio 
Broadcasting Commission (later Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation), especially the imminent domination by American 
radio networks, the lack of willing private investors and the 
need to foster national identity and unity 
To provide an explanation for the origins of the CBC, it is 
important to understand the circumstances and events leading to 
its creation in 1932. In the 1920s, radio transmission in canada 
was mainly a commercial venture undertaken by the private sector. 
Except for the radio stations owned by Canadian National 
Railways, most privately-owned radio stations were provincially 
based and did not serve the whole nation. Due to long distances 
and the lack of powerful transmitters, private radio stations 
could not provide broadcasting on a national basis. 
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Private radio ventures were mostly urban based and their 
programs were dominated by commercials and advertisements to 
enable them pay for their operations. Because the radio stations 
relied on advertisements for revenue, they tended to concentrate 
in urban centres where there were potentials for revenues from 
advertisements, consequently the rural population were not 
adequately served by these radio stations. 
Right from the 19205, when radio broadcasting began in North 
America, there has been conflict between the United States and 
Canada on the allocation of channels. The United States wanted 
channels to be allocated on a population basis. Moreover because 
Amerlcan networks, such as NBC and CBS, used more powerful 
transmitters than Canadian broadcasters they interfered with the 
channels allocated to Canada. William Malone noted that 
"interference from the United States stations ... coupled with 
low power used by Canadian stations impeded the reception of 
Canadian broadcasters. "[22J In addition to these interferences, 
American networks were buying into Canadian stations . In 1929 
NBC established a permanent service in Toronto and by 1932 
American networks had five affiliates in Montreal.[23J Frank 
Foster acknowledged the threat of American domination when h-
remarked that "American broadcasters were laying claim to Canada, 
by network connections to Canadian stations and by direct 
broadcasts, as an area for them to serve."[24J 
In the 1920s religious organizations such as the Jehovah's 
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Witnesses and the National Bible Students' Association, began to 
use radio as a means of preaching the gospel. In 1928 the federal 
government refused to renew the licence of the National Bible 
Students' Association because some listeners considered its 
religious broadcast as offensive. This sparked a controversy on 
religious freedom and the right of the government to censure 
radio broadcasting. In response to all of these problems the 
government appointed a Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting 
(hel~""!'i:.i.fttE!r Aird Commir..;si()n) in "i92::: t..e. "e::<a.fIlinf..~ inte. th~:~ 
broadcasting situation in the Dominion of Canada, and make 
recofllmendation to the government as to the future 
,""drfl:i.nistr·cttion, rfli:'i.·n.:::.~:;)emf2nt., cor·it.r·ol 21nd fini::lnc in';;;l thfE.··!~fE!of. "1::2!.SJ. 
The Commission was under t.he Chairmanship of Sir John Aird, 
the President of Canadian Bank of Commerce. In the course of 
studying t.he radio broadcast.ing situation in the count.ry. the 
Commission noted that 
II The I <;;\c k 0 f l"'i'?Vt:?rl\.~e !···Ia~;;. . .. t.encl!;.~d 
more and more to fOl"'ce t.oo much 
advel"'tising upon t.he listenel"'s. It 
also appeal"'s to l"'esult. in t.he 
cl"'owding of stat.ions int.o urban 
centl"'es and the consequent. dupli-
cation of service in such places 
leaving othel"' lal"'ger populat.ed areas 
ineffectively served ... the majority 
of programs heard al"'e fl"'om SOUl"'ces 
outside Canada... the continued 
l"'eception of these has a tendency to 
mold t.he minds of the young people 
int.o ideals and opinions that al"'e not 
Cc!l"1ii~d i i::tn . II I:: 21::. J 
1·-, ., 
.. :' I 
The statement reflected precisely the radio broadcasting 
situation in Canada in the late 1920s, characterized by 
fragmented regional based radio stations, urban orientation, 
commercial emphasis, and a high degree of foreign content. To 
address these problems the Commission recommended that 
"A~:; ot..l1""· fOl"'E:m.;:;.st con!:;iidel"'r.:ltion. l.'v'!!:!! 
have concentrated our attention 
on the broad consideration of the 
interests of the listening public 
and of the nation ... we are impelled 
to the conclusion that these interests 
can be adequately served only by some 
form of public ownership operation 
and control behind which is the 
national power and the prestige of 
the whole public of the Dominion of 
Ci.::trl~:ld,,,, . II r.: 27] 
It is interesting to note that the Chairman of the Commission 
and the President of Canadian Bank of Commerce, presumably an 
advocate of private enterprise, would endorse public ownership 
some form of public ownership" would ensure an effective radio 
service in Canada. This probably reflects the Canadian elite 
disposition to public ownership. 
Before the recommendations of the Commission could be 
implemented, the Liberal government was replaced by a 
Conservative government which was preoccupied by the depression. 
1 :32 
However, the subject of radio broadcasting was revived again when 
Quebec and New Brunswick challenged the jurisdiction of the 
federal government to regulate inter-provincial radio 
broadcast. In 1932, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
ruled that the federal government has jurisdiction over 
inter-provincial radio broadcast. [28J After the ruling, the 
government established a Special Parliamentary Committee to 
consider the recommendation of the Aird Commission 
The uncertainty surrounding prIvate radio stations in the 
light of the recommendations of the Aird Commission coupled with 
government licensing policy stifled the development of private 
radio stations. Foster is of the view that private stations were 
willing to sell to the government because broadcasting was not a 
profitable venture. [29] The Ontario Radio League and CPR were 
against the nationalization of radio broadcasting. Mr Beatty. the 
President of CPR suggested a broadcasting corporation operated by 
CN and CPR.C30]. The case for nationalization was advanced by the 
Canadian Radio League under the leadership of Graham Spry. 
According to Spry "the job of the Canadian Radio League was to 
S€~f.:'! tha t. N r. Benne t t. WOL! 1 d g i Vt:'! t"'i! >::p r' f!"!S s i on to V"Hi!! dem"~ nd 0 f e\/f..~ r' y 
Canadian for a decent broadcastIng system, that was Canadian in 
]. ~:tl-. gt? pii.'! r' t. . II C :::::1 ] 
In 1932, t.he government finally decided to adopt the 
recommendat.ions of the Aird Commission by nationalizing radio 
broadcast.ing. When the Prime Minister Hon R.B. Bennet.t 
"t.his COlJnt.·ry mu!:;t. be ~~s!::;!..H'ecl of 
complet.e Canadian cont.rol of 
broadcast.ing from Canadian sources, 
free from foreign int.erference ... 
Wit.hout. such cont.rol ... it. can never 
be t.he agency by which 
consciousness may be fost.ered and 
nat.ional unit.y st.ill furt.her st.reng-
t.hened ... No ot.her syst.em of radio 
broadcast.ing can meet. t.hese nat.ional 
requirements. "[82J 
In spite of t.he fact. t.hat t.he Prime Minist.er was once a solicit.or 
for CPR and a personal friend of t.he President of CPR, he opt.ed 
for public ownership. Perhaps, t.his reflect.s t.he st.at.ist. 
t.radition of t.he Canadian polit.ical culture and elite disposition 
t.o use public ownership if the opport.unity occurs. Moreover, the 
t.he House of Commons. [33J 
The cont.radiction bet.ween the cent.re and t.he regions, which is 
another facet. of t.he Canadian polit.ical culture, may have 
influenced t.he decision of t.he government. to creat.e CBRC. While 
Quebec and New Brunswick were challenging the federal 
government.'s jurisdict.ion, privat.e radio stations were also 
regionally-based reinforcing t.he cont.radict.ion bet.ween t.he 
regions and the cent.re. This st.ate of affairs was compounded by 
the t.hreat of American domination which fuelled nationalist. 
sentiments. Public ownership of radio broadcasting was intended 
to foster national unity and identity as well as preempt American 
dOl"iiination. 2J·hE~. GJs:,t;:t~.' not.l;:!d th21t. ,. irnpE:r·:i.al at!;;; tAlell ,;;I!::; n~:lt.:i.orlal 
considerat.ions have impelled t.he government. to nat.ionalize radio 
in Canada. "[34J. The creat.ion of the CSC very much reflect.ed key 
facets of the Canadian polit.ical culture: elite disposition 
t.owards public ownership; the need to foster nat.ional unity 
between the disparate regions; and tn promote national 
consciousness and stem American domination. 
From a political economy perspective, it is plausible to 
suggest. that public ownership of radio broadcasting was intended 
to fulfill the legitimizat.ion funct.ion of t.he st.at.e and to stem 
American dominat.ion. After World War I, the Canadian economy 
increasingly relied on American investment and technology. but 
the state was determined to insulate cert.ain sectors of the 
economy from American dominat.ion. Radio transmission was 
considered a vit.al instrument for national unit.y which must be 
controlled by Canadians. The Prime Minist.er not.ed this fact when 
he remarked that "Canadian broadcasting must be free from foreign 
interference". Thus radio broadcast.ing was considered strategic 
to the nation and foreign ownership should be avoided at all 
c: os t. . 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the government was 
studying the broadcast.ing sit.uation, political protest movements 
and regionally-based political part.ies, such as the Maritimes 
Rights Movement. United Farmers of Alberta and the Progressives 
were emerging with strongholds in the regions. Perhaps 
nationalization of radio broadcasting was necessary to prevent 
these regional political parties and protest movements from using 
the medium of radio to advance regional and sectional political 
interests, especially during the depression when regional 
discontent was rife. Because radio broadcasting was regionally 
fragmented. it had already become a medium for the expression of 
sectional interests and diverse religious ideas, some of which 
were undermining the legitimacy of the state. [3SJ The need for 
some form of social harmony to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
system may have influenced the decision of the federal government 
to create CRBC. The objective of legitimization was above the 
interests of any fraction within the capitalist class. Perhaps, 
this may explain the decision of the federal government to 
override the opposition of certain private interests to the 
nationalization of radio broadcasting. 
n~e creation of the CRBC could not be attributed to the lack 
of entrepreneurship advanced by the political culture approach. 
Before the creation of the CRBC. the private sector was providing 
radio services in Canada. In fact, the Aird Commission commended 
the private sector "for its effort to provide entertainment for 
the benefit of the people with no direct return of revenue."[36J 
However, the structure and size of the Canadian market did not 
allow for the growth of a national radio station. Private radio 
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broadcasting in the United States prospered because the size of 
the market was propitious to private radio transmission. 
Following its establishment the CRBC took over CN Railways' 
broadcasting quarters in Halifax and Montreal. The CRBC was 
intended to regulate radio transmission and transmit radio 
s i '.dna 1 s thr·ough(;)!...It. thf:'? C()I.Ant.·I~y. It!.E:..._J.~~;,!;? __ .etlJn!dj'!l!.LJ:;.§'p.Q'(:..:L_ 0 f t.hE:: .. 
CBRC not.ed t.hat., wit.h it.s operat.ions, "t.hlE' ::;;)€~O'd'('<::lphical baY'ri,::, .. r· 
Qf dist.ance is being surmounted and in this way t.here t.ends to be 
a disappearance of parochialism and the development of a vigorous 
nat.ional perspective."[37J The CRBC was hamstrung by government. 
control. Limited financial resources did not allow the Commission 
to establish networks that would reach every part Qf Canada. 
AccQrding to Foster, there were complaints from western Canada 
that t~e Commission did not have enough programs to explain 
Canada t.o the diverse peoples of the west. [38J The Minister of 
Marine also retained the responsibilit.y for the issuance of 
1 i c \\'?nc t:~S . 
The CBRC increasingly came under t.he influence of the 
government in power. In 1935, the Commission was involved in a 
PQlitical propaganda program for the Conservative Party known as 
the 'Sage broadcasts' . When the Liberal Party came into power in 
1935, it repealed the CRBC Act and established t.he Canadian 
Broadcast.ing Corporat.ion. CBC was intended t.o operate t.he only 
radio network in the country. regulate radio broadcast and make 
recommendations to the government. regarding radio licences. 
As a public enterprise. CBC was intended to transmit radio 
signals nation-wide in English and French, as well as produce 
Canadian programs to t . 1 • t n,o'l' .1 ona .1. lAn J. .• y and ich·:::!lltity. 
the CBC began television transmission. and since then, the CBC 
has been featuring programs with a high level of Canadian 
programs carry 70% Canadian content and even higher levels for 
radio. The CBC also runs both English and French radio and 
television networks which serve about 90% of the Canadian 
public.[39J The CBC has become a medium for the expression of 
Canadian cultural identity. 
A Gallup poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public 
Opinion in 1991 revealed that 77 percent of Canadians believe 
that the CBC television network is a necessary institution in 
Canada.[40J Thus after six decades of operation. Canadian still 
consider the CBC as a cultural institution which must continue to 
foster cultural identity and national unity. This demonstrates 
the cultural disposition of Canadians to support pubic ownership 
of nation-building institution, such as the CBC. 
There is no doubt that the creation of the CBC was Influenced 
by the Canadian political culture, and since its inception, the 
CBC has been cultural instrument fostering national consciousness 
and identity as well as unity. Nevertheless, certain aspects of 
the Canadian political economy, especially the size of the 
market, lack of willing private investors and the need to fulfill 
creation of the CBC. 
TRANSCANADA AIR LINES/AIR CANADA 
After World War I, air transport became & major means of 
transportation in the developed world. Although Canada had a 
number of air line corporations, most of them were regionally 
based and did not service the whole nation. The United states 
also had its share of privately-owned air line corporations which 
were increasinyly capturing a share of the Canadian market. 
Policy makers were apprehensive of the possible dOMInatIon of 
Ca0adian air line services by American air lines. Langford 
observed that II in terms of industrial structure there were no 
private firms ready to make the leap to a national carrier 
status ..... [and] there was widespread consensus within the 
cabinet on the nature of the threat from United states air 
1 i r-n::?S . "I:: 4 "I J 
In 1937. the Canadian government saw the need to establish a 
national airline. When C.D. Howe, the Minister for Transport 
moved the motion for a national air line to be created he noted 
that. 
"C2!ncl.ci2! is pf,:;r'h2tpr:, one of t./·"!I:::: f!::?\~j 
countries in the world without a 
rl2d .. :i. on2, 1. sc t'l 1.'.7: d\.,j ]. E!!d 2. i.,..· s~!?rv i r.: e .... 
Many Canadian citizens when 
travelling from one point to another 
in Canada find they have to use the 
air lines in the United States, 
and they have been very insistent 
In demanding the establishment of 
i~'l d i l"t:~C t. Cr.:~n<::,d i <::\'1'"1 ~::;i~.,·r·v :i. c ~,~ . " [1.1.:;';:::1 
Government concern about. Canadian reliance on American airlines 
was part. of t.he motivat.ion underlying the creation of TCA. 
Besides this reason, nat.ional unity and int.egration were also 
important. considerations in t.he decision of the federal 
government to establish a national airline. Public ownership of a 
national airline was viewed positively by policy makers in the 
context of possible domination by American airlines and the need 
to counteract. some of the centripet.al forces bet.ween t.he regions. 
and t.he centre. Stevenson has suggested that part of t.he 
motivation underlying the creation of the TCA was to provide 
communIcatIon links bet.ween the disparate regions wit.hout. relying 
on the United States. [43::1 This fact was acknowledged by C.D. Howe 
when he stated that. a national carrier 
" wou 1 d P)"" (;:.ve 0 f i rflrfH:!~n~::;e v <:llI.M:2 for 
n;:~t.ional pur'po~7~Ei.'~S. .. tr'le pE,:.oplE: 
living at t.he extremes of this 
country would be able to travel 
more frequently t.o the centres 
of government business ..... and the 
inter-relat.ions of the country would 
t.ht'2l"t:2!:')y b,=: fac il i t.a~ted" [44] . 
The government. int.ended t.o engage t.he interest of the privat.e 
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sector in the creation of a national airline by offering to bear 
the cost of the necessary infrastructure and underwrite the 
losses of the new national airline. The government approached CPR 
and privately-owned Canadian Airways, but partly due to 
dIsagreement over the composition of the board of directors, the 
proposals of the government were turned down.C4S] 
Subsequently the government decided to establish a national 
air carrier as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Canadian 
National Railways. The CNR would then assume the responsibility 
of offering shares to interested corporations. In 1937 an Act of 
Parliament established Trans Canada Airlines CTCA) with the 
mandate "to establish and operate air line services across Canada 
and matters incident thereto".C46J 
The underlying motive for the creation of a national aIr line 
was spelt out in the speech by C.D. Howe. The government 
intended to use the national air line to stem American domination 
of Canadian aIr line services, integrate the disparate regions 
by establishing air line services between them and the centre. 
The national air line was also intended to be symbol of 
nationhood and pride for Canadians. Thus, it could be argued that 
the Canadian political culture, to a large extent, influenced the 
government decision to create a national airline. 
Within government circles, public ownership did not generate 
as much objection as the relationship between the CNR and the 
TCA. The leader of the opposition, Mr Bennett noted that "I am 
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clear in my mind that we should make some effort towards 
plead with the Minister to reverse the process, to own the 
member of the House, Mr. H.C. Green (Conservative Party) noted 
JI:C t't:!']':i e\/t~1 t.j-ia t. C:<:irj~~ilj 1. 2tr'i~5 :l i1 \':'/(:;.::r·""r' 
part of the nation are keenly 
interested in the establishment of 
a trans-Canada alr service ... I am 
heartily in favour of the establishment 
a trans-Canada air service ... I would 
ask the Minister why the government 
does not take the lead in organizing 
tl"'iis nt::'w t.rc~ns;·····Canc~.dE~ air lin<,:: it.sl\'!!lf. "Uf.::;:J 
Thus, members of the House of Commons, to a large ext.ent, 
accept.ed the need for t.he creation of a Trans Canada Air line 
service. The main source of objection was the government. decision 
not to assume direct ownership of the TCA. There was at least 
some consensus on government ownership. This observat.ion lends 
support to the assert.ion that Canadian policy makers are inclined 
to 'big government' and public ownership, although some private 
interests, such as CPR and Canadian Airways, were probably not in 
favour of public ownership. 
From a polit.ical economy perspective, it could be argued that. 
policy makers were driven by t.he need to provide infrastruct.ure 
in a situation where the private sect.or was unwilling or unable 
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to assume that responsibility. It must be noted that, before TCA 
was established, Canadian air lines were regionally based and 
were unable to meet the infrastructural needs of the nation as a 
whole. 
When C.D. Howe introduced the 8ill to establish the TCA, he 
noted that "much of our mail is routed across the border, 
transported by air services of the United States ..... The volume 
of this air mail is sufficient to warrant the establishment of 
direct service in Canada. "[49J Thus, there was not enough 
infrastructure to meet the needs of the nation in terms of air 
mail. 8esides mail service, Canada also needed an air service to 
transport people and goods swiftly from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. 8y opting for public ownership, the state was actually 
acting in the interest of the capitalist class as a whole by 
providing infrastructure to facilitate capital accumulation. 
Stevenson has suggested that public ownership and state 
regulation of the airline industry served the interests of 
Canadian capitalism which required a safe, convenient, reliable 
and efficient system of transportation. [SOJ Perhaps, certain 
fractions of the capitalist class represented by CPR and Canadian 
Airways may have been against public ownership, but the state 
overrode their interests for the benefit of the capitalist system 
as a whole 
Due to the size and structure of the Canadian market, the 
private sector, at the time, did not have the capital to 
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undertake an airline service on a national basis. Moreover, CPR 
and Canadian Airways did not take advantage of the government 
offer to engage their participation in the formation of the TCA. 
It is the view of Stevenson that CPR did not respond to the 
proposals of the government, perhaps, because it had financial 
interests in Canadian Airways and would not want to engage in 
another venture which would compete with Canadian Airways.[SlJ 
The lack of interest or inability of the private sector to 
establish a national air line service or respond to government 
proposals was not due to lack of entrepreneurship as advanced by 
the political culture approach. After all there were 
Canadian-owned airlines at the time. Probably, the size and 
structure of the Canadian market and the colossal amount of 
capital required to establish a national air service discouraged 
the private sector. In the United States, the private sector was 
able to take advantage of the size of the market, and the airline 
industry prospered under private ownership serving the domestic 
market and trans-border routes. 
There is no doubt that the government intended to use TCA as 
a cohesive instrument to preempt American domination. From the 
political culture approach, the presence and overwhelming 
influence of the United States on Canada have fuelled 
nationalist sentiments which have found expression in the 
creation of nation-building institutions such as TCA. The 
political economy approach asserts that the Canadian dependency 
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on American capital and technology is increasingly driving the 
Canadian economy into a state of economic dependency and the 
consequent loss of political sovereignty. Government attempt to 
assert control has sometimes led to public ownership. 
Undoubtedly, the imminent American domination was an 
important consideration in the decision to create a national air 
lIne. The government did not consider it appropriate that 
Canadian citizens and mails should be routed through the United 
States by American air lines. Molot and Laux rightly stated that 
"st.at.e int.t"!'·I~\/ention in t.h€~ int.er·war· y\'!!!.~rs l~l",!t.u·!~nE·d t.o it~~ 
tradit.ional format. of est.ablishing nat.ion building instit.ut.ions 
tn protect. Canada from the spillover of American interest.s."[S2J 
As a public corporation, TCA was a public policy tool, 
influenced by the Canadian political economy and polit.ical 
culture. Although Canadian Pacific Airlines (hereafter CPA) 
received t.he routes t.o Australia and Japan, the government. 
granted TCA a wide range of monopoly right.s t.o profit.able 
int.ernational rout.es so that. it. could make enough profits t.o 
service uneconomic routes which in 
As a public policy tool, TCA was insulated from competition. 
In 1943, the Prime Minister noted t.hat 
"Tl~<:H'l!:,JCanadi:, (-)1 r' L :i. n~~s is t.he so], E' 
Canadian agency which may operate 
international services. With i"l", 
Canada, TransCanada Airlines will 
continue to operate all transcon-
t.inE'ntal ~;ysti'?r(!S;. "[.1.::;3] 
In the 1950s private air lines complained about the monopoly 
right.s granted to the TCA. In 1954 CPA applied for licence to 
route from Vancouver to Amsterdam. 
In spite of opposition from the government and the management of 
TCA, CPA obtained the licence. React.ing t.o the application by 
CPA, the President of TCA at the time, Gordon McGregor, noted 
"I \;J~!!S st .. ill OPE!r-i::!t.in~;j on t.h!'? l.~·ndE:l~s····· 
t.anding t.hat it was the gover-nment.'s 
policy for- TCA, as t.he nat.ional 
air-line, to be t.he Canadian flag 
car-rier- ... we t.r-ied to minimize t.he 
danger to t.he TCA by advocat.ing that 
approval should be made contingent 
upon an extremely definite st.ipulat.ion 
that neither- at the outset. nor- at. any 
later time would the CPA be given 
t.raffic rights at any ot.her point. in 
Ci::lni::ldi::\ . "U':;4] 
Through the Air Transport Board, the government. protect.ed TCA 
from compet.ition to ensure it.s survival as a nation-building 
From 1958 t.he government began to pursue a policy of 
gradually allowing competition from other air lines, especially 
CP Airlines. In 1965 TransCanada Air Lines was re-named by Air 
., 4f:, 
C,,,, n c\di::! . [GS] I 'n 1 97:;:: the ::;;)ove r' rll"llen t. ame!r·lcll~·d t.hE!! .. JtU: .... J;:.:.i§.\L@\.::;"J.,'E.L..J).f . .1:. t. () 
deregulate the air line indust.ry and allow privately owned air 
lines t.o compet.e wit.h Air Canada. Under the new Act, Air Canada 
was separated from CN and direct.ed to operate as a commercial 
enterprise with a profit motive.eG6] 
The origins and operation of Air Canada has been influenced 
by t.he polit.ical culture and polit.ical economy. Cer't.ain aspects 
of the Canadian political cultur'e, especially t.he cont.radict.ion 
bet.ween the cent.re and t.he regions and the need t.o pr'eempt. 
American domination, fuelled nat.ionalist. sent.iment.s which were 
sometimes channelled into the cr'eation nation-building 
institut.ions, such as TCA/Air' Canada. In view of the general 
consensus within the House of Commons during the debates on TCA, 
it might be argued that the stat.ist t.radition in Canada also 
influenced policy makers in opting for public ownership. 
Polit.ical and economic forces also influenced the decision of 
t.he government t.o create a public enterprise. The size and 
structure of the Canadian market. hindered the growt.h of a 
privately-owned national airline, consequently the government 
intervened t.o fill the gap left. by the private sector as well as 
preempt the domination of American airlines. The stat.e was also 
compelled by the need to provide infrastructure and to meet the 
interests of private capital. As an instrument of nation-
building, Air Canada has had t.o contend with increased domestic 
and international competition. Torn between these two opposed 
objectives of commercialization and nation-building, Air Canada 
was in a dilemma in the 19805. The government gave up its public 
policy objectives and began a privatization program in 1987. The 
program was completed in 1989.ES7] The origins and operations of 
Air Canada have been influenced by the Canadian political 
culture and changing political economy. 
POLYMER/POLYSAR LTD 
During World War II, the role of the state in Canada, as in 
the United States, increased considerably. The role of the state 
went beyond the prOVision of infrastructure to undertake 
production to assist the war efforts. Polymer Ltd was one of the 
war time public corporations created in 1942 in response to the 
exigencies of World War II. In 1941 I 90 percent of the world's 
known supply of natural rubber came under Japanese control. There 
were many concerns about declining supplies of natural rubber in 
North America and Europe. Shortage of natural rubber posed a 
serious problem to allied war efforts, because natural rubber was 
an important raw material in the production of munitions. 
In Canada, the construction of a synthetic rubber plant was 
given serious consideration by the Department of Munitions and 
Supply. Subsequently, the government established the Rubber 
Substitute Advisory Committee which was later superseded by the 
Rubber Technical Advisory Committee. ES8] The Canadian government 
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in conjunction with the United states government and the private 
sector decided that twenty synthetic rubber plants should be 
established in North America; nineteen in the United States and 
one in Canada. [S9] 
Subsequently, in 1942 the Minister for the Department of 
Munitions and Supply introduced a 8ill in Parliament for the 
creation of synthetic rubber factory - Polymer Ltd. Polymer Ltd 
was charged with "building and operating a synthetic rubber plant 
as the Canadian contribution to the war rubber program."[60J 
In 1943, when the Minister of Munitions and Supply, C.D. 
Howe, was recounting the cIrcumstances that led to the creation 
of Polymer Ltd, he noted that 
"ThE: rlJbbel"' c .!~ is i ~:; c cHile on 1"IS; sl,lCk!e"f11 y 
when Singapore was threatened we 
had occasion for the fil"'st time to 
be concerned about our stocks of 
rubber .. OUl"' neighboul"'s in the south 
wel"'e in the same position. It was 
decided by consultation that the only 
satisfactol"'Y substitute fol"' natural 
rubbel"' is the type of l"'ubber known as 
bklrli:,,··-!::; , •. [f.·1 J 
State ownership of synthetic rubber manufacturing cannot be 
attributed to the Canadian political culture.In the United 
States, in spite of the belief in individualism and 
laissez-faire, the state also advanced plans to establish 
nineteen synthetic rubber plants when the supply of natural 
rubber was thl"'eatened by Japan. 
Rather than the political culture approach, it was the 
political economy of the war situation that motivated the 
creation of synthetic rubber plants in the United States and 
Canada. In all capitalist states, like Canada, the economies are 
run mainly by private capital; however, in times of emergency or 
economic crisis which could not adequately be dealt with by the 
private sector, as in the case of World War II, the state 
sometimes intervenes to deal with the crisis. The federal 
aovernment took the initiative and established Polymer in 1942, 
because the private sector could not deal with the rubber 
crisis. 
In the 1940s, synthetic rubber manufacturing was a pioneering 
venture involving complex chemical processes that were still 
being mastered by the chemical industry in North America. The 
private sector was not particularly interested in the production 
of synthetic rubber because of the uncertainty associated with 
pioneering ventures, especially during the war. In Canada the 
difficulties of organizing private capital promptly to address 
the crisis influenced the government decision to create Polymer 
Ltd .. Thus, the extenuating circumstances of the war, the novelty 
of synthetic rubber production and lack of private capital 
compelled the government to establish Polymer Ltd. The situation 
was no different in the United States. 
Mr. NicholsonCCCF) noted in parliamentary debates that "when 
our supply of natural rubber supplies disappeared, the firms 
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which normally might be expected to manufacture rubber were not 
Thus, the unwillingness of the private sector to invest in a 
pioneering venture was also an added reason for the creation of 
Polymer Ltd in 1942. 
The creation of Polymer Ltd cannot be attributed to the 
statism of the Canadian political culture. Hardin, who subscribes 
to the political culture approach, concedes that "Polymer Ltd was 
an historical accident. If World War II had not occurred creating 
an emergency need for synthetic rubber, Polymer Ltd would not 
!"·!i:'i\/E~ occul~r·ed. "[6:3] 
From a political culture approach, Polymer Ltd could have 
been a historical accident, but from the political economy 
approach, it was intended to deal with the emergency and the 
crisis engendered by 
private sector to deal effectively with the crisis. 
By 1943, Polymer Ltd had met all design specifications and 
production began at the Sarnia plant, using inputs from the 
petroleum industry. Polymer Ltd was the first integrated 
synthetic rubber factory, manufacturing the main components of 
synthetic rubber - butadiene, styrene and isobutylene. Polymer 
petrochemical industry such as Dow Chemicals and Canadian 
Synthetic Plant. Between 1944 and 1954 the government investment 
in the plants increased from $48 million to $72.3 million and 
employment rose from 1,853 to 2,458.[64] 
Peace time demand for synthetic rubber increased considerably 
in North America and Europe. American plants under private 
ownership were serving the North American market and capturing a 
share of the European market. Polymer Ltd was also capturing a 
share of the export market; in 1953, about 50 percent of the 
output was exported, 30 percent going to Europe and the balance 
to the United States.E65] Polymer began to explore the European 
market as part of a larger program to adjust to peace time 
production. To meet the increased demand for synthetic rubber 
after tile war, the plant at Sarnia was expanded and two more 
plants were erected in Europe. A specialty plant was completed in 
France in 1962 and in 1963, a butyl plant was completed in 
Belgium. An international marketing organization was established 
in Switzerland and a joint venture in Mexico. By the late 1960s 
Polymer Ltd was controlling about 10% of the world synthetic 
rubber market. In the 1970s, Polymer Ltd diversified into latex 
production in North America and Europe.E66] 
The United States government returned the synthetic rubber 
plants to the private sector after the war. By the late 1950s, 
synthetic rubber production was under the control of the private 
sector. However, Canada retained Polymer Ltd as a public 
corporation after the war - this could possibly be attributed to 
the statism of the Canadian political culture and the inclination 
of policy makers. 
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In 1943, when the Polymer plant began production, C.D. Howe 
$45,000,000 in the production of artificial rubber, and when this 
program is finished the government's e~)ansion in that direction 
will be finished also. If any private industry cares to carryon 
assertion, after the war the government did not make any serious 
effort to privatize Polymer. In 1946, CoD Howe noted that 
"thE~ i"ilC:tnLlf<'-!lctLlrl'.:· of s·y'nt.het.ic r'l"lbber' 
by the government. of Canada is for 
the general advantage of Canadian 
business. I have yet. to hear of 
any business man suggest. it. was not 
a good t.hing for Canadian business 
to have Canada's only source of 
rubber in the hands of the government 
rather t.han in the hands of private 
c:()r·i=ICtr2\t.i()rl=:~. II [f~:,!::J 
Mr NicholsonCCCF) also noted in parliament.ary debates that 
II i t. h~~ S~ b~?€!l"l d~=!I"llonjs t r' a t.t?d t. 1"'1 i:1 t, <:~ 1-', i ';;Jh 
qualit.y of synthetic rubber can be 
made by Polymer, there are those who 
think that t.he government should 
retire from this field. The Minister 
should be wise enough not to pay too 
much attention to those who argue that 
the free ent.erprisers should have a 
clE!ar' !si::iiJ.in';;J in thi!::i f:i.eld."[69J 
The government was ambivalent on Polymer's fate after the 
war. While the Minister hinted that that they would be prepared 
to dispose of Polymer, he also intimated t.hat it was beneficial 
and in the int.erest of business for Polymer to be retained as a 
public enterprise. In spite of the ambivalence, the government 
eventually settled with the retention of Polymer Ltd. There were 
some policy makers, besides the Minister, who felt that Polymer 
should be retained by the government. There was little political 
disagreement with the view that Polymer should be retained after 
the war. The inclination to retain Polymer, even after the 
extenuating circumstances leading to its creation had 
disappeared, could be attributed to the statism of the Canadian 
political culture. Moreover, the private sector according to the 
Minister did not object to public ownership. or express any 
desire for Polymer to be privatized. 
Perhaps, the private sector was content with public ownership 
of Polymer Ltd. because of the high cost of research and 
development and rapid technological changes in the synthetic 
rubber industry. Through public ownership the cost of research 
and development, which would otherwise be borne by private 
capital, was socialized for an industry which produces inputs 
for several sectors of the economy. It is plausible to suggest 
that continuous public ownership of Polymer Ltd. served 
manufacturing interests dependent on inputs from the synthetic 
rubber industry. In 1972, the government sold Polymer Ltd to 
Canada Development Corporation (hereafter CDC), a newly created 
mixed enterprise, and in 1973 it was renamed Polysar Ltd .. 
The origins of Polysar Ltd was dictated by the political 
economy of the war situation rather than the Canadian political 
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culture. The United States qovernment also resorted to public 
ownership to deal with the rubber crisis c~ring the war. Although 
the United States privatized synthetic rubber production after 
the war, Canada retained Polysar after the war. The difference in 
attitude towards synthetic rubber production after the war could 
be attributed to the differences in political culture and the 
inclination to public ownership in Canada. It is also possible 
that the difference in government policy after the war may have 
been shaped by different political and economic forces. Perhaps, 
Canada opted for continuous public ownership because it served 
certain manufacturing and private interests. 
CANADA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
In the late 19605, there was a growing sense of economIC 
nationalism in response to increased foreign control.The 
government was also concerned about increased non-resident 
control. Due to the lack of capital and the weakness of the 
capital market, risk capital for small and new firms as well as 
capital-intensive projects was critically lacking. A gap was thus 
perceived in the Canadian industrial and venture capital sectors 
~!}hich Wi:,S bl?in,;;) fill!;::d b'y' non---r-e::sidt!!.'nt ciEq:::dt.al. Tht? g.!2..'tf.:tl. 
federal government. to study the issue of non-resident control in 
CiEtni:.,d~:;;. . £: 70:1 
In response to these Reports, the federal government of Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau was determined to address the problem of 
foreign control. Besides other policy instruments, the government 
decided to establish a mixed enterprise -Canada Development 
Corporation (hereafter CDC). Commenting on the formation of the 
"C<:!!ni:!dians; h c:l v€.· long been concer'n0!'cl 
about the increasing foreign control 
of their economy, mainly through the 
purchase by Americans of one firm 
after another ... CDC will not make an 
attempt to buy Canada back from 
foreign investors ... it may help keep 
some firms now in Canadian hands from 
sl:i.pping l,lnd~"!l~ fc:.rei'';jri own(ifrf:;hip. "C7"!:1. 
company with the mandate 
1) To help develop and maintain strong Canadian -
controlled and managed corporation in the 
pl"':i.vc:!t.e sector'. 
2) To give Canadians greater opport.unit.ies t.o 
:i. r"iVe';::~ t . 
3) To operat.e profit.ably in t.he int.erest. of all 
shareholders.C72l 
The government. also st.at.ed t.hat. CDC will neither be an agent. of 
and t.he government. will not. interfere wit.h t.he operations of the 
Corporation. 
From a political culture perspective, the rise of economic 
nationalism in the late 1960s may have influenced the decision of 
the government to create CDC. Gallup poll results, published by 
the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, revealed that while 46 
percent of the respondents in 1964 felt there was too much 
American capital in Canada, 60 percent felt the same way in 
1967, and in 1972 it was 62 percent. [73J Economic nationalism in 
Canada has sometimes been directed against the United States and 
has sometimes motivated state interventionist policies. The 
creation of the CDC cannot be divorced from the pervading sense 
of economic nationalism in the late 1960s. 
The inherent lack of entrepreneurship is another facet of the 
Canadian political culture, which is presumed to motivate state 
interventionist policies.[74J During parliamentary debates on the 
creation of CDC, NDP Member for Waterloo, Max Saltsman also noted 
that "what has happen in Canada has been the failure of 
entrepreneurial spirit. We have have been too cautious. "[75J Due 
to lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the Canadian economy is 
increasingly coming under foreign control and some form of policy 
instrument is required to assist entrepreneurship. Subsequently, 
one of the objectives of CDC was to develop and maintain 
entrepreneurship in the private sector. 
The CDC was received with mixed feelings in the House of 
Commons. The NDP members in the House felt that SInce the CDC was 
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supposed to operate with the intention of making a profit it will 
not be able to address the issue of foreign control or Increase 
Canadian ownership in the economy. Max Saltsman noted that 
".~ f tE.H·· VJ2! it. i n~j for E: i ';Jht. yea rEo for a't 
Canada Development Corporation, I 
will not have very much to say in 
its favour ..... It. seems to be 
designed to undercut the growing 
concern that has taken place in this 
country ..... We need something t.hat 
will act. as an instrument for Canadian 
government policies and secure 
Canadian objectives. You cannot do 
this with a corporation primarily 
ol'iented t.ow2!pds ppofit.. "[76] 
The leader of the opposit.ion, Mp St.anfield, noted that. 
"bf2fo)"'e b\:rdng asked t.o est.~1blish t.he 
Canada Development. Corporation, we 
ought. to have before us the 
government.'s analysis of the reason 
why we are losing control of the 
economy and the reasons Canadians 
are not participating ... , we see no 
evidence that. the creation of yet 
another crown corpopat.ion would at 
this time do anything effective 
either to increase 
i ndE:pf?ll(:i!?llce. "[77] , 
CElnadian 
Though the issue of foreign control was at the fore, not all 
policy makers, at the time, felt that the creation of a public 
enterprise could deal adequately with t.he problem. While the 
Conservatives were against public ownership at the time, thE:.' NDP 
were in favour of a public enterprise with public policy 
objectives eschewing profits. The reaction to the creation of the 
CDC revealed the disposition of the part.ies, at the federal 
level, towards public ownership. This may support the suggestion 
that party ideology has some influence on the use of public 
ownership as a policy instrument. This is contrary to the 
argument advanced by the political culture approach that, 
because of the statist tradition in Canada, all political parties 
are inclined to use public enterprises when the opportunity 
oc cur·s. 
The domestic and international political economy also 
influenced the government decision to create CDC. When the 
need for a public enterprise along the lines of the CDC was that 
"bus:i.ness and indtJstr'y h;:;\ v fE: 1:;;:ntfE!r'€~d 
a new period of internationalism 
which makes it desirable that there 
be a number of Canadian controlled 
corporations with 
in Canada and with 
j-'!e;:;!dqL!2! r' t€~l~S 
2! kind of 
institutional strength and management 
capabilities to compete successfully 
in C;::~nC:1da arId intt::'i~nationally.I'[7:::J 
The Minister's statement underlines how internationalization of 
the world economy exerts pressure on national governments to 
assert some control over the economy as well as increase the 
international competitiveness of the national economy. Due to the 
weak manufacturing sector, Canada is unable to compete 
effectively in the global economy, and the national economy is 
increasingly coming under foreign control to the detriment of 
Canadians. For example in 1970, Canadians controlled only 39 
percent of the manufacturing sector, while Americans controlled 
47 percent.C79J It is the view of Laux and Holot that the 
creation of the CDC is "inseparable from a decade of debate over 
the consequences of high levels of foreign investment in Canada, 
especially over the role of American branch plants."CSO] CDC was 
a policy instrument, partly motivated to address the issue of 
foreign control and increase the international competitiveness of 
A mixed enterprise was considered appropriate, because it 
would enable the CDC to serve public policy objectives with 
minimum government intervention and meet the commercial 
objectives spelt out in the mandate. The political culture 
was chosen as the appropriate policy instrument instead of a 
wholly-owned government enterprise. 
From a political economy perspective, it could be argued that 
CDC was a policy instrument designed to meet the interests of 
various sections of the business community as well as other 
political forces. The nationalist faction of the business 
community, most often 'small businesses' which lack investment 
capital and are sometimes victims of takeovers by foreign capital 
were very much in favour of a public enterprise with nationalist 
objectives.CSll On the other hand, certain factions of the 
business community were against the creation of the CDC. 
'!60 
According to Brooks, the CDC was considered by some sections of 
private sector hegemony in the produce-for-profit sector. "[82J 
Although the Liberal Party has traditionally supported 'small 
business', it did not want to alienate other factions of the 
business community. Brooks has suggested that there were some 
reservations within the Liberal Party on the creation of a public 
enterprise, and bureaucrats at the Department of Finance were in 
favour of some form of fiscal policy to encourage Canadian 
investors rather than public ownership.[83J The Liberal 
government's attempt to strike a balance between all these 
contending forces led to the creation of a mixed enterprise 
CDC. According to Brooks 
" :i n view 0 of th i s comb i ni::t t. ion 0 of 
bureaucratic disinclination and 
private sector opposition. The 
government decision to create a 
mixed enterprise ...... must be 
attributed to the political 
commitment that had developed 
under successive Liberal governments 
.... Thus, symbolic expression was 
~J:i.ve:n to n;;:,tionalist. demands. "[:;::4:1 
CDC was int.ended t.o appease nationalist sentiments and certain 
fractions of the business community without alienating the 
business community as a whole. Nationalist sentiments were 
evident in the mandate establishing the CDC. The Act stipulated 
that the directors and shareholders should be Canadians or 
Canadian residents. It was intended that a public share offering 
would eventually reduce the government equity share to ten 
percent. 
As a policy instrument, CDC was intended to operate in 
certain sectors of the economy with growth potentials. In this 
regard, the corporation concentrated in six areas of operations 
including; petrochemicals; pipelines and transportation in the 
north; petroleum and natural gas; mining smelting and refining; 
venture capital and pharmaceutical products. 
In an attempt to increase Canadian control of the economy, 
the CDC did not only engage in buying back foreign controlled 
firms, but encouraged and promoted the sound growth of Canadian 
controlled firms. It increased the supply of Canadian equity 
funds and investment opportunities to reduce Canadian dependence 
on non-resident capital. 
In 1972, the CDC bought Polysar Ltd from the federal 
government. The CDC supported Polysar Ltd in a joint project with 
Dupont Canada Ltd. which led to the creation of Petrosar Ltd in 
1978.C85J In the mining sector, CDC acquired 35 percent of 
Texasgulf Inc. in 1973. In 1981 CDC exchanged the equity interest 
in Texasgulf plus $536.7 million cash for Texasgulf's mining, oil 
and gas interests in Canada.C86] 
In the petroleum and natural gas industry, the CDC acquired 
the Canadian assets of Tenneco Oil and Gas Ltd. in 1975 for about 
$111 million. The company was renamed CDC Oil and Gas Ltd. In 
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1981 CDC purchased 75 percent of Aquitaine Company of Canada, and 
all the oil and gas companies were brought together under 
Canterra Energy Ltd.[87J 
Through CDC Venture Inc .• Canada Development Corporation 
operated one of Canada's largest pool of venture capital. It 
provided venture capital for small and new firms with growth 
potentIals. In 1978, the CDC acquired AES Data and Wordplex Ltd. 
producers of word processing equipment. Though Wordplex Ltd was 
divested in 1984, CDC operations expanded into the production and 
marketing of office information products through the CDC Data 
Systems Ltd .. [88J 
In the pharmaceutical industry. CDC Life Sciences Inc 
acquired Connaught Lab Ltd and Bio-Research Lab Ltd. CDC also 
owned 50 percent of Allelix Inc .• a relatively new venture, 
f2>::plorinl.~ applie!d resear·ch in t.he f:i.eld of biot.echnolclI.JY. [:;:::3] 
The CDC did not. only provide venture capital for Canadians, 
but successfully part.icipated in the int.ernational economy 
t.hrough its numerous subsidiaries. The CDC had subsidiaries 
operat.ing in t.he U.S., Europe, South America and Aust.ralia. 
Brooks has argued t.hat while these int.ernational invest.ments 
generated surplus value and contributed t.o Canada's balance of 
trade, t.hey did not contribut.e to t.he indust.rial development of 
the domestic economy.[90J 
The origins of the CDC were influenced by certain feat.ures of 
the Canadian political culture, especially t.he inherent. lack of 
entrepreneurship and the rise of economic nationalism. The CDC 
was received with mixed feelings in the House of Commons 
indicating that there was a lack of consensus on how to assert 
I . .• . I . the pervaclng economIc naGl0na. Ism . Public ownership was not 
favoured by all the members of the House. This is contrary to the 
political culture interpretation that statism is a pervasive 
feature of the Canadian political culture. However, it lends 
support to the argument advanced by the political economy 
approach that party ideology may influence the choice of policy 
instrument. 
Foreign control, lack of venture capital, increased 
international competition and the need to assert control over the 
national economy were some of the political and economic issues 
underlying the creation of the CDC. The political and economic 
pressures within the Liberal Party and from various sections of 
the business community as well as from the bureaucracy shaped the 
choice of policy instrument. The political economy approach 
advances a more potent explanation for the creation of the CDC 
than the political culture approach, especially on the factors 
underlying the choice of a mixed enterprise as a policy 
instrument rather than a wholly-owned government enterprise. 
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING: DE HAVILLAND AND CANADAIR LTD 
Canadair Ltd and De Havilland are privatized public 
enterprises which have been shuffled between private and public 
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ownership since their inception. The focus here is to determine 
whether the Canadian political culture or the political economy 
was the driving force behind the government's decision to assume 
ownership of De Havilland and Canadair Ltd in the mid 1970s. 
The aerospace industry is a high-risk industry, requiring 
large amounts of capital and technical know-how. Research and 
development is very important in high technology industry. In the 
early 19705 a substantial part of the aerospace industry in 
Canada was controlled by multinationals, such as McDonnell 
Douglas, Hawker-Siddeley and General Dynamics. 
When World War II started, the federal government built an 
aircraft manufacturing plant and leased it to Vickers Ltd, a 
British subsidiary. Anticipating a decline in the demand for 
aircraft after the war, Vickers Ltd intended to move out of 
aircraft manufacturing in Canada. However, the federal government 
was reluctant to close down the aircraft plant leased to Vickers 
Ltd, so in 1944 the federal government took over the operations 
and created Canadair. In 1947, the federal government sold 
Canadair to Electric Boat Company, the forerunner of General 
Dynamics.[91J 
In 1947, a government-owned aircraft manufacturing company, 
Victory Aircraft, was sold to Hawker-Siddeley, another British 
multinational. Hawker-Siddeley later absorbed De Havilland Ltd, 
an aircraft manufacturing company incorporated in Canada in 1928 
by British De Havilland.[92J 
Thus, after World War II both De Havilland and Canadair Ltd 
were under private ownership. Under private ownership both De 
Havilland and Canadair relied heavily on military aircraft and 
exports to the United States. Canadair exported 80 percent of 
its output, the bulk of which went to the United States. [93] The 
government ordered the North Star aircraft for TransCanada 
Airlines and the F-86 for the Canadian Armed Forces. [94] 
In the 19505, De Havilland was supplying aircraft to the 
United States for the Korean War. At the peak of the Korean War 
De Havilland had a workforce of 6,OOO.[95J Through government 
military acquisition policy. the Canadian government supported 
De Havilland. Between 1947 and 1952, government financial support 
amounted to 56.6 million. The federal government also provided 
qrants to Canadair to the tune of 568 million between 1947 and 
1975.[96] 
American defence policy of sourcing military aircraft from 
the United States and the declining involvement in Vietnam after 
1970, coupled with the cutbacks in the procurement budgets of the 
Canadian forces, drastically reduced the demand for military 
aircraft from Canadair and de Havilland. Sales prospects at De 
Havilland was bleak and sales at Canadair plummeted from 5117.5 
million in 1970 to $40 million in 1973.[97] 
In the 19705, the aerospace industry was shifting away from 
military aircraft to commercial aircraft and the space program. 
In response to these changes, General Dynamics was channelling 
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its decreasing contracts to its parent company in the United 
States. Hawker-Siddeley was reluctant to proceed with the 
development of the STDL Dash 7 aircraft because it favoured the 
development of a similar aircraft at home. 
There was a growing concern in Canada that foreign ownership 
was constricting the aerospace industry in Canada. In response to 
declining demand for military aIrcraft and the international 
restructuring of the aircraft industry, General Dynamics and De 
Havilland were reluctant to recapitalize their operations in 
Canada. In 1975, Mr T.C. Douglas (NDP) noted in parliamentary 
d€.~t-:)atl?s t.hat. "GenE!l~al D''r'namics hi!:"\si alv.Ji:.'1'/s put. it.!:; fut.L!rE":! ar·,e2.d ()f 
Prime Minist.er, Pierre Trudeau, observed that t.he government !'has 
discussed and is concerned with situat.ions ..... where control of 
companies is exercised abroad sometimes not. to the benefit. of 
In 1974, Hawker-Siddeley declared it.s int.ent.ion to wind up 
operat.ions in Canada in spite of government financial support.. 
After supporting t.he Dash-7 project financially, t.he government 
did not. want the project. t.o be abandoned. The government signed 
an option agreement to purchase De Havilland by June 1974, hoping 
to int.erest. t.he private sector in buying t.he corporation. Spar 
Aerospace Product.s and Canada Internat.ional Comstock Company 
expressed some int.erests in buying De Havilland, but. t.hey did not 
.. oj. 1· ... ) so the government. exercise t.he option and purchased De 
Havilland for $38 million.[lOO] 
In 1975, General Dynamics also declared its intention to shut 
down operations if it did not find a purchaser. Since there were 
no willing indigenous private investors to replace General 
Dynamics, the federal government purchased Canadair for $38 
million in December 1975.[101J Commenting on the reasons for 
public ownership of Canadair, Borins and Brown noted that "to 
shut down Canadair would have meant losing the technological 
advances that have been achieved .. (andJ since Canada is a major 
consumer of aviation products, the 1055 of Canadair would have 
had unfavourable effects on the country's balance of trade. "[102J 
By the mid 19705, both Canadair and De Havilland were under 
public ownership. 
In response to the question of why the government assumed 
ownership of Canadair in 1975. Donald C. Jamieson, the Minister 
for Industry, Trade and Commerce noted that "Obviously it is to 
have Canadian control over the aerospace industry"[103J. The 
Minister further noted in 1976 that the government assumed 
ownership of De Havilland and Canadair 50 that "there will be an 
excellent possibility of restructuring the aircraft industry in 
Canada and getting a stable industry more controlled by 
Canadians. "[104J. The decision by the federal government to 
purchase Canadair and De Havilland was a response to the 
symptoms of a weak manufacturing sector, domination of the 
manufacturing sector by multinationals, Increased 
168 
international competition and the need to assert control over the 
A considerable part of the aerospace industry in Canada was 
controlled by multinationals in the 19705. Due to world wide 
changes in the aerospace industry, and increased international 
competition, these multinationals were restructuring production 
by transferring contracts to their parent companies. In Canada, 
the parent companies of United Aircraft Company, Douglas Canada 
Ltd, Canadair Ltd and De Havilland Ltd were all transferring 
their decreasing contracts to their parent companies. Canadian 
Investors could not replace them because they lacked the capital, 
technological capabilities and marketing experience required in 
tl"'!21t "t.he I;;;Jov!::':!r'nm€~nt. :i.s not. <.:;;n::-::ic'Lis t.o ~:;;jf.?t int.o bUl!!;in€.'ss, t.hE~ 
Minist.er', Alast.air Gillespie wants to find newall-Canadian 
corpor'ation buyer to take over these companies."[lOS]. Lack of 
indigenous capitalists also compelled the government to assume 
ownership of Canadair. 
Laux and Molot observed t.hat the feder'al government took 
over the aircraft manufacturing companies "as part of a response, 
not to market failure, but to the effects of global restructuring 
by successful international fir'ms. To ensure a national presence 
in a leading industry, the stat.e became an entrepreneur". [106J 
Although the government was not bent. on going into aircraft. 
manufacturing it was forced by circumstances, especially the 
domestic and international political economy, to assume 
ownership. There was, at least, some agreement in government that 
Canadair and De Havilland should come under government ownership, 
partly, in response to the general feeling of economic 
nationalism that pervaded Canada at the time, and the concern 
that foreign control was disrupting the aerospace industry in 
External threats to Canada have always engendered a feeling 
(:.'1' !':.":conomic n2,t:ion<'::llisIYI, SOI'l'I(-E!tim(-2s, e>::pr'e~:;;s:;ed in t.he cr'0~ation of 
public enterprises. That feeling was compounded by the domestic 
political economy, especially t.he lack of int.erested indigenous 
private investors to assume ownership of the companies. In both 
cases the government. signed an option agreement with t.he 
int.ention that the private sector would express some interests 
and the option will not be exercised. 
In the United States aircraft manufacturing is entirely 
under the control of indigenous capital, and the huge American 
market, as well as export sales, can support several VIable 
companies. American government policy of sourcing military 
aircraft from domestic sources also ensured the survival 
of the aerospace industry, so the government did not have to 
assume ownership to save the industry from collapse. The 
difference in the ownership st.ructure of aircraft manufacturing 
in the Unit.ed States and Canada is not so much due to the 
difference in political culture but the politics and economics of 
'j '70 
aircraft manufacturing. 
It could also be argued that because of the slack in the 
aerospace industry. private capital was unwilling to risk 
investment in the sector. By taking over De Havilland and 
Canandair, the government was socializing the cost of sustaining 
these companies as well as the high cost of research and 
development, which would otherwise be borne by private capital. 
Other political and economic considerations, such as sustaining 
jobs in the ailing aerospace industry also influenced the 
decision of the federal government to assume ownership. Perhaps 
the Liberal Party wanted to sustain its political support after 
the 1974 election victory. and so it assumed ownership of 
Canandair and De Havilland to sustain jobs in the aerospace 
industry. Moreover the Liberal Party's commitment to state 
interventionist policies and economic nationalism may have 
influenced the government's decision to assume ownership. [107J 
Canadair and De Havilland were bailed out by the federal 
government in response to by 
General Dynamics and Hawker-Siddeley. Government intervention was 
required because indigenous industrialists were presumed not to 
have the ability, or interest, to undertake high technology 
ventures and compete in the international market at the time. 
In response to the intense feeling of economic nationalism 
the government did not see it fit in 1975 to consider offers from 
foreign investors, so in the absence of indigenous investors the 
iTl 
government assumed ownership. The Canadian political culture of 
economic nationalism, mainly, directed against non-resident 
control was compounded by the domestic and international 
political economy to compel the government to assume ownership of 
De Havilland and Canadair Ltd in the mid 1970s. However, 
international changes in the aerospace industry and the domestic 
political economy were particularly important factors which 
shaped the decision of the government to assume ownership of 
Canadair and De Havilland. 
PETRO-CANADA LTD 
Petro-Canada is one of the largest public enterprises with 
assets worth $6.8 billion in 1990.[108J. More than earlIer 
resources, the oil and gas industry requires large amounts of 
capital and technology. American multinationals which have 
acquired the technology and the capital base for oil exploration 
gravitated towards Canadian oil fields after World War II. 
Consequently the Canadian oil and gas industry has traditionally 
relied heavily on foreign capital, especially American capital. 
American subsidiaries prospered with the oil boom in the late 
1960s. In the 1970s, the oil and gas industry was one of the 
fastest growing sectors in the economy with very high capItal 
returns. However, most of the profits were going to AmerIcan 
multinationals. These multinationals self-financed their 
internal growth without resorting to Canadian equity capital, 
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thus entrenching themselves in the oil and gas industries and 
precluding the participation of Canadian equity capital that was 
avaIlable. Table 12 shows the high degree of foreign ownership in 
the petroleum and gas industries in 1973 and 1975. It also shows 
the high degree of growth and self-financing in the industries. 
Assets in the industries increased by about 40 percent between 
1973 and 1975, for the same period revenue increased by 80 
percent. A large part of this increase was controlled by American 
The Canadian government estimated that, in the 1970s, over 90 
percent of the assets in the oil and gas industry were under 
foreign control.C109] The operations of these multinationals were 
profit motivated, so they neglected the high risk aspect of the 
petroleum industry. 
In the early 1970s, the climate of political opinion 
underwent radical changes. Canadians were particularly concerned 
about American presence and domination of the economy. The 
stimulated nationalist sentiments. Gallup polls released by the 
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in 1973, showed that 48 
percent of Canadians were in favour of the nationalization of 
energy resources while 36 percent were in favour of private 
ownE.~r's>hip. C'I 11 ::I 
It was under this political climate that the Liberal Party 
formed a minority government with NDP backing. The Liberal 
( i I": m i 11 i (H'lS ) 
1 (,,002 
Degree of Self-Financing % 'I :::n ,.s '! :;;;:7, () 
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7fj. '7 7Ei,.1 
For'e:i.,;;;]n C:ont.r·Ql 
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Source: Adopt.ed From Pratt, L 'Energy: The Root.s of 
No,7 Wint.er, 1982,p,44 
Party's precarious hold to power made it responsive to 
public opinion and NDP pressure. The government, under NDP 
pressure, reviewed the energy policy in a paper entitled 'An 
Energy Policy For Canada - Phase I'. The policy review appraised 
the role of the government in the oil industry and the creation 
of a national oil company with tentative conclusions. The 
government began to regulate the e~)ort of crude oil to the 
United States by imposing export duties. Domestic price controls 
were also imposed to protect consumers in Canada. This sparked a 
row between oil producing provinces, led by Alberta, and the 
federal government .. 
It was in the midst of these policy directives that the 1973 
Arab-Israeli conflict broke out and subsequently disrupted the 
international oil market. Oil became a political weapon and the 
OPEC cartel began to exert control over the price and export of 
crude oil The structural relations between the oil-producing 
countries and the multinationals underwent radical changes. 
Although the Arab oil-producing countries did not place an export 
embargo on Canada, the government was concerned about the 
security of external oil supplies. This concern was confirmed 
when a United States subsIdIary, Imperial Oil, diverted a portion 
of imported crude oil destined for Canada to the United States. 
In response to these developments the NDP introduced a motion in 
Parliament in October demanding that a National Petroleum 
company be established.[112J Although the motion was not adopted 
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immediately. in December the Prime Minister. Pierre Trudeau, 
noted that the new oil policy of Canada would involve I'the 
establishment of a publicly owned petroleum company principally 
to e>::pedit.I:::.· ,:."!>::pl(::'l~ation and d~.~.'vE.::lopri'!f:?nt..'I[·i 1:3:1. In 19'74, t.h~.:.:: 
government. introduced a bill t.o creat.e a national oil company. 
but. t.he government. was defeated in parliament. on an unrelat.ed 
issue. The government's int.ention t.o create a nat.ional oil 
company in 1974 was, partly, intended t.o appease t.he NDP. 
However, when the Liberal Part.y ret.urned t.o power in 19'74, wit.h a 
majority, it was det.ermined to create t.he national oil company 
envisaged in 19'73. The electoral vict.ory of t.he Liberal Party may 
have been int.erpret.ed by t.he part.y as a mandate to pursue the 
creat.ion of a nat.ional pet.roleum company 
In 19'75, when t.he Minister for Energy. Mines and Resources 
"Thl:::! t.er'IY!~5 i!:ind cI"·'i:Hln'E':I. of ,::IC c\~ss to 
overseas oil and energy supplies t.o 
meet deficiencies in our own domest.ic 
resources have sharply changed. Fresh 
uncert.aint.ies have arisen .... The 
government does not. feel assured t.hat 
t.he private sector can be relied upon 
to mobilize all of the enormous amount 
of capital which will be required to 
secure energy development. ,.we are 
looking to the company to increase t.he 
Canadian presence in a sector which is 
of cl"it.ici:d. impOy't.cHlce." ['j 14] 
The Minister's statement captured the domestic and international 
political economy which impelled the government to create 
Petro-Canada in 1975. 
The inherent lack of entrepreneurship in Canada, has been 
advanced by the political culture approach, to explain state 
interventionist policies and public ownership intended to support 
the private sector. In the case of the petroleum industry, since 
there were some Canadian-owned firms in the industry, state 
intervention could not be attributed to lack of entrepreneurship 
Perhaps, the structure of the industry and the lack of private 
capital did not permit the full participation of Canadians, 
consequently some form of government intervention may have been 
required to ensure a significant Canadian presence. 
The rise in economic nationalism in the early 1970s also 
influenced the decision of the federal government to create 
PetroCanada in 1975. Economic nationalism in Canada has often 
been tinged with anti- American feelings because of the 
overwhelming presence of American economic interests in Canada. 
The statist tradition of the Canadian political culture may 
have influenced policy makers to create PetroCanada. The fact 
that the United States did not create a national petroleum 
company to deal with the 1973 oil crisis could be attributed to 
the difference in political culture. 
In spite of the inclination towards public ownership. the 
17"7 
Commons. James Gillies, a Conservative member, noted that "There 
is nothing that suggests that we need this particular corporation 
to do the things that the Canadian people want done. It will not 
produce one extra barrel of oil for Canada."[llSJ. On the other 
hand, T. C. Douglas of the NDP noted that "we in the NDP not only 
do not object but welcome the wide powers and the financial 
investments which are authorized by the legislation."[116] 
Though at the time the feeling of economic nationalism was 
widespread, not all policy makers felt that a national oil 
company was the appropriate means of channelling this 
nationalism. Perhaps, instead of the Canadian political culture, 
other factors such as the class interest of political parties 
and other political and economic forces may have influenced the 
government's decision. 
From a political economy perspective, the United States did 
not require a national oil company to deal with the 1973 oil 
crisis, because indigenous capital was in control of the domestic 
oil industry and a sizable portion of the world oil industry. So 
the changes wrought by the 1973 oil crisis were felt differently 
in the United States and Canada. Mainly because of the nature of 
the Canadian political economy, a national oil company was 
considered an appropriate policy instrument to deal with the 
crisis. In the United States the government regulated the supply 
of oil and domestic oil reserves assumed a new importance. 
The structure of the petroleum industry and domestic 
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political pressure may have influenced the government. The 
economic rent accruing to the oil industry was being captured by 
the oil-producing provinces led by Alberta. These provinces were 
in favour of competitive market prices for petroleum and the 
rapid exploitation and exportation of these resources. Meanwhile 
the oil consuming provinces in eastern Canada were in favour of 
some form of government intervention to regulate the price and 
e~)ort of petroleum products to ensure the security of supplies. 
The 1973 oil crisis underlined the insecurity of external oil 
supplies, especially for the provinces east of the Ottawa valley. 
which depended on external sources. The fact that the federal 
government wanted to share in the economic rent accruing to the 
industry and pressures from consuming provinces in eastern Canada 
also influenced the decision of the federal government to create 
PetroCanada in 1975. 
These developments were compounded by the domestic political 
situation, especially NDP pressure on the Liberal minority 
government to establish a national petroleum company. Although 
PetroCanada was finally created in 1975, Pratt has noted that 
II thl'E! NDP prf.~!s·::;l,jrlE.' c ~?r' tiEl i 1'11)/ 1 n 1" J. Lif.',,'nC 1E.~d t.hf::" tim :i. r1~1 0 f tl"'le 
.;::11;::.'c i:sion. "r:'1 '17::1 
Prat.t. has also suggested t.hat. pressure from t.he Minist.ry of 
Energy. Mines and Resources bureaucrats, who wanted to extend 
their influence and exert. cont.rol over a volatlle international 
oil market also influenced the decision t.o creat.e PetroCanada in 
Petro-Canada was to a large extent a response to the 
domestic political economy and the global restructuring of the 
oil market. Larry Pratt notes the "the Canadian state involved 
itself directly in economic development in response to threats 
fr'orn the fl::-::tt::Jr'ni::ll E··n\/ii~onme·nt ........ in this Ci::\f=;€!~ t.!'''le {~r'ab oil 
producers and mult.inational oil companies that were deemed to be 
obj €.~c t i VE! 
"to E~>::plor·€.:· for' hyc!rc)ccIPbon (::lej:.~,,:)~::;it.~.:;} 
to negot.iate for and acquire petroleum 
products from abroad to assure 
continuity of supply for the needs of 
Canada .. and to engage in e~)loration 
. , . and l'fli::lrhi?ti'ng of fUI::.::ls. II [.! 19] 
The decision of the federal government to create PetroCanada was 
not intended to displace privat.e capital but to serve t.he 
interest of Canadian capitalism as a whole. The Minister For 
Energy Mines and Resources noted that in spite of the creation of 
il'l!poi"t8.nt. l~ole!~ in t.his:; ar·\:::.'i~" of tht"i! economy. Perh.:r:tp~;i, t.h~::' 
decision t.o create a nat.ional oil company was intended to serve 
the interests of certain fractions of the capitalist class. It 
was in the int.erests of major oil consumers in east.ern and 
central Canada for the government to restrict. export.s and 
regulat.e oil prices to ensure security of oil supplies. Pratt has 
suggested that the creation of PetroCanada may be seen as a "step 
to protect the interests of oil-dependent manufacturers and 
• .1 t . ). n('Jl'!~":·". r' ). es concerned about the security of t.hE:~ :i. 'j'" 0 i 1 
supp 1 :i. to?!::; !I £: 'j 20 J 
Petro-Canada was.grant.ed a five-year budget. of $1.5 billion 
to undert.ake t.he exploration and development of hydrocarbons and 
ot.her types of energy; carry out energy research and development; 
hydrocarbons.£:121J 
In pursuit of these objectives, Pet.ro-Canada's operation was 
oriented mainly towards upstream activities in the oil industry. 
Wit.h the assistance of government. grants, Petro-Canada was able 
t.o UndtE:l~ t.ii.'1k~? h:i '~h l~ i ~::;k f J~ont.:i ~:"'l" 0 i 1 ,:;.'::<p 1 or'a t. i ()n wh :i. c h V,le:\S e,VO i CiE.'';::! 
by privat.e companies in the indust.ry. These vent.ures involved 
e~Jlorat.ion of t.ar sands, heavy oil, t.he Arct.ic Islands and t.he 
offshore Labrador shelf. Privat.e capit.al was reluct.ant. t.o 
undert.ake high-risk front.:ier o:il explorat.ion because of t.he iarge 
amount.s of capit.al required and the uncertain rates of return. 
It may be suggested that. PetroCanada was socializing the high 
risk aspect of t.he industry. Prat.t. has not.ed that there could be 
some element of t.ruth to int.erpret "the Liberal decision to 
est.ablish a st.ate oil company as merely another policy t.o 
t.he federal government transferred its 45 percent. interest in 
Panarct.:ic Oils and 15 pecent. int.erest. in Syncrude to 
1 :::::-1 
To increase Canadian ownership in the petroleum industry, 
Petro-Canada began the acquisition of mostly foreign owned oil 
companIes. In 1976 Petro-Canada acquired Atlantic Richfield 
Corporation (renamed Petro-Canada Exploration Inc). It also 
acquired Pacific Petroleum in 1978 and 8elgian owned company, 
Petrofina Canada Ltd in 1981.[123] 
In 1979, Joe Clark's minority Conservative government came to 
power with a promise to privatize PetroCanada. Stanford has 
suggested that the commitment to dismantle PetroCanada was part 
of an electoral strategy to please oil-producing provinces which 
were Tory strongholds. E124] However, Joe Clark's government was 
replaced by the Liberal government, which, in turn, shelved the 
privatization program and began to strengthen PetroCanada 
through the National Energy Program. The reaction of the 
Liberals. the Conservatives and the NOP to PetroCanada may seem 
to suggest that these parties have ideoloqical differences with 
regards to a national petroleum company. It is plausible to 
suggest that the Liberal Party's disposition to public ownership 
may have influenced the timing and the creation of PetroCanada. 
This suggestion that may have some element of truth in the light 
of the fact Mulroney's government introduced the Western Accord, 
deregulated the petroleum industry, repealed the National Energy 
Program and declared its intention to privatize PetroCanada. 
In 1991, Petro-Canada began to offer shares to the public in 
response to government intention to privatize the company. As at 
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August 1991 I the government still accounts for about 81% of the 
.. j.... . 
!'fe r'lSe nationalism and anti- American feeling are 
features of the Canadian political culture which may have 
influenced the decision of the federal government to create 
PetroCanada. The inherent statism of the Canadian political 
culture may have also influenced the reaction of the government 
to the 1973 oil crisis. 
In addition to these aspects of political culture, the 
domestic political economy. especially the structure of the oil 
industry, and lack of private capital, also lnfluenced the 
decision to create PetroCanada. Bureaucratic pressure, political 
alliances and forces, the Liberal Party's disposition to public 
ownership and the interests of certain factions of the capitalist 
class were all factors which shaped the decision of the 
government. Lastly. the changes in the international oil industry 
also compelled the Liberal government to intervene. 
The political economy and political culture approaches 
capture some of the factors underlying the creation of federal 
public enterprises. The discussions of the origins of these 
selected public enterprises demonstrate the complexity of the 
factors underlying the creation of public enterprises in Canada. 
Although both approaches provide explanations for the 
creation of these selected public enterprises, the political 
economy approach provides a relatively better explanation for the 
creation of some of the selected public corporations, including 
Polymer Ltd. I De Havilland, Canadair Ltd. and Petro-Canada. On 
the other hand, the political culture approach captures some of 
the factors underlying the creation of some of the selected 
public enterprises which are not considered under the political 
economy approach. For example some of the reasons underlying the 
creation of CSC and TCA fit relatively well into the political 
culture model. Nonetheless, both approaches provide explanations. 
although from different perspectives, on the origins of federal 
public enterprises. 
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...... CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine the political 
economy and political culture approaches to the explanation of 
the origins of federal public corporations, and to determine 
which of the approaches best captures the Canadian experience. As 
part of the objective. the two approaches have been applied to 
the study of selected federal public corporations and former 
public corporations in Canada. 
Public enterprises have been motivated by certain features of 
the Canadian political culture. Some of these features include 
collectivism, statism, conservatism and lack of individualism and 
laissez-faire ethics. The political culture perspective notes 
that Canadian liberalism, unlike that of the United States, has 
a streak of toryism, which has fostered elitism, particularism 
and collectivism in Canadian society. The lack of individualism 
and the commitment to organic unity and collectivism have 
created an atmosphere favourably disposed to public enterprises. 
The disposition to collectivism and organic unity has inclined 
policy makers to make increasing use of public enterprises when 
of Confederation enjoined the federal government to construct the 
Intercolonial Railway. Since then, policy makers have exhibited 
high levels of consensus in the creation of public enterprises 
such as Air Canada, CSC and Teleglobe. However, in spite of 
pervading attitudes of statism and collectivism, there was lack 
of consensus on the creation of some public enterprises. 
including CDC and PetroCanada. 
The defensive colonial settlement in Canada, as opposed 
the uncontrolled frontier in the United States, stifled the 
development of individualism, entrepreneurship and laissez-faire 
ethics in Canada. Lack of entrepreneurship and laissez-faire 
ethics have created a gap in the private sector in Canada, which 
has on several occasions been filled by the creation of public 
enterprises, such as the CDC and. to a certain extent. Air 
Canada. 
From the political culture perspective. Canada is hinged on 
three sets of contradictions based on French Canada against 
English Canada; the regions against the centre; and Canada 
against the United States. These sets of contradictions have 
engendered nationalist sentiments and a need for national 
integration which have found expression in the creation of 
federal public corporations such as the Intercolonial Railways, 
CSC and Air Canada. The contradiction between the United States 
and Canada has also stimulated nationalist sentiments tinged with 
anti-American feelings and, sometimes, economic nationalism. 
These sentiments have motivated Canadianization programs. 
sometimes involving the creation of public corporations. such as 
CDC and PetroCanada. 
From a political economy perspective, public enterprises are 
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established to fulfil the accumulation and legitimization 
functions of the state. Through public enterprises, the cost of 
infrastructure is socialized to facilitate private capital 
accumulation and promote economic development. This was part of 
the motivation underlying the creation of the Intercolonial 
Railway. Air Canada and Canadian National Railways. The 
legitimization function of the state partly motivated the 
creation of public enterprises, such as the Canadian Wheat 80ard, 
the Farm Credit Corporation and DEVCO. 
Due to the peculiar situation of Canada's political economy, 
especially the staples economy. limited market and the proximity 
of an aggressive American economy, the Canadian state has gone 
beyond the mere provision of infrastructure to assert control 
over the natlonal economy and to counter American domination by 
creating public enterprises. The CN, cec and Air Canada were, 
partly, created to provide infrastructure as well as preempt 
American domination. 
Public enterprises are, from a political economy perspective, 
policy instruments designed to ensure the long-term survival of 
the capitalist system. Although public enterprises are partly 
created to serve the interests of capitalism as a whole. they 
might serve the interests of the capitalist class and, sometimes 
subordinate classes depending on the political and economic 
situation. Cases in point are CN. CDC, PetroCanada and Telesat. 
In the case of CN, it was intended partly to serve the interests 
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of graln farmers in the west as well as merchant and banking 
interests, while Petro-Canada served the interests of 
oil-consuming provinces in east and central Canada. In the cases 
of Telesat and CDC, mixed enterprises were considered the 
appropriate policy instrument to meet the conflicting demands on 
the state by various economic and political interests. 
Party ideology and the class interest of the major political 
parties are other features of the Canadian political economy 
which have influenced the creation of public enterprises. This 
was particularly so in the late 1960s and 19705, when the Liberal 
Party's commitment to nationalism and economic independence 
motivated the creation of public enterprises, such as CDC, 
PetroCanada and, to a certain extent, De Havilland. The 
disposition and the class interest of the Conservative Party may 
explain the Party's opposition to the creation of the CDC and 
PetroCanada. 
Emergencies or crises, such as the World Wars or the Great 
Depression, which threaten the capitalist system as a whole, 
have also motivated the creation of public enterprises. Partly 
because the private sector could not deal with the exigencies of 
these situations, the state intervened, sometimes by creating 
public enterprises. In Canada. the Great Depression and the two 
World Wars led to the creation of a number of federal public 
corporations including the Canadian Wheat Board, Polymer Ltd .• 
Defence Communication Ltd. and Turbo Research Ltd. 
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Lack of private capital in Canada is another reason, 
according to the political economy approach, which has led to the 
creation of public enterprises in Canada. The argument suggests 
that the emphasis on trade and staples, coupled with the high 
cost of labour and the small Canadian market, retarded private 
capital accumulation, since a substantial part of the capital 
accrued to the metropole. This dearth of private capital has 
frequently compelled the government to undertake projects to 
complement the private sector. Some of the federal public 
corporations created in response to the lack of private capital 
include Canadian National Railways. WeIland Canal, Air Canada, 
Petro-Canada and the Canada Development Corporation. 
Another thread which runs through the political economy 
approach is Canada's belated and dependent manufacturing sector 
which is unable to stand international and domestic competition. 
This weakness 1S in part due the dependence of the Canadian 
manufacturing on American capital and technology. especially 
since the end of World War I. As a result of this dependency. the 
Canadian economy has increasingly come under foreign. especially 
American, control. In the 1970s the government was determined to 
asser~ control over the national economy by establishing public 
corporations, such as the Canada Development Corporation and 
Petro-Canada, to ensure a significant Canadian presence in 
certain sectors of the economy. From a political economy 
perspective. these enterprises may have served the interest of 
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certain fractions of the capitalist class, especially the 
nationalist fraction and small businesses. 
Due to the weakness of the manufacturing sector the Canadian 
economy continues to rely on the export of staples which depend 
on external demand and prices. The dependence on trade and 
staples has led to increasing demand on the state to establish 
public enterprises to deal with the instability associated with a 
staples economy and to provide infrastructure to facilitate the 
export of these staples. This may partly explain the creation of 
CN and of marketing boards, such as the Canadian Saltfish 
Corporation. Canadian Wheat Board and the Canadian Grain 
Commission. 
Due to the increased globalization and internationalization 
of the world economy after World War II, national governments 
have increasingly lost control of their national economies. In 
Canada, foreign capital has increasingly dominated the economy, 
rendering the manufacturing sector dependent and uncompetitive. 
This has led to the creation of public enterprises to enhance the 
international competitiveness of the Canadian economy. bailout 
private firms which fail in the face of increased international 
competition and increase Canadian presence in certain sectors of 
the economy. These developments partly led to public ownership 
of De Havilland and Canadair Ltd, and government investment in 
Consolidated Computer and Fisheries Products International. 
Using these two approaches, the study examined the origins 
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of selected federal public corporations and former public 
corporations to determine which of the approaches explains best 
the Canadian experIence. 
The political culture approach, like the political economy 
approach, is a useful explanatory model for the emergence of 
federal public corporations in Canada. The 'fragment theory' of 
the political culture approach provides a good explanation as to 
why the Canadian polity. unlike the American, is favourably 
disposed to public enterprises. However, the political culture 
approach has certain weaknesses when applied to the origins of 
specific public enterprises. The argument that the streak of 
toryism in Canadian liberalism has led to the creation of public 
enterprises is a catch-all explanation for public enterprises in 
general. but does not explain the emergence of specific state 
The political culture approach provides potent explanation 
for the size and nature of public enterprise sector in Canada. 
But the approach is always applied in a comparative framework, 
most often with the United States. Comparative analysis explains 
the differences in the size, structure and nature of the public 
sector in Canada and the United States, but the predictive 
strength of the approach, when it comes to the specific public 
corporations, is limited. While the Canadian polity might be 
disposed to 'big government' and state intervention, this does 
not explain why Polymer Ltd. nr •••• 1 for that matter, De Havilland or 
Canadair were created. 
For example, government ownership of the Canadian National 
Railways was not 50 much a result of the Canadian political 
culture, but the extenuating circumstances of the war and the 
fact that Canada's credibility in the investment market was at 
stake. In spite of the difference in the political culture of 
Canada and the United States, the United States government also 
assumed management of railroads temporarily during the war. The 
political economy approach provides a better eNllanation of 
government ownership of the Canadian National and the fact that 
government ownership occurred in the United States as well, 
although to a lesser extent. 
The political culture approach fails to take into account the 
fact that the circumstances underlying the creation of public 
enterprises are unique. Certainly the creation of CN, CDC, 
PetroCanada and De Havilland cannot be attributed to the same 
reasons of statism, elitism and conservatism. They were all 
motivated by different circumstances. There is no convincing 
e~planation. within the political culture model, for the choice 
of a policy instrument, such as a mixed enterprise. This renders 
the political culture approach ahistorical in terms of explaining 
the dynamics of public enterprises. 
The political economy approach is dynamic and provides 
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explanation for the emergence of public enterprises in general 
and of specific public corporations in Canada. For instance, 
during the World Wars and the Great Depression, public 
enterprises were created in both Canada and the United States, in 
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political culture. The dynamism of the political economy approach 
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the creat.ion of public corporat.ions such as Polymer Ltd 
World War II. For instance, CN, the aircraft manufacturing 
companies and Petro-Canada were created in response to issues 
which go beyond t.he Canadian political culture. These were all, 
part.ly, mot.ivated by complex political, economic and social 
f 2'.C tors. 
The dualism and the het.erogeneit.y of t.he Canadian polity 
which, according t.o the political cult.ure approach, has stirred 
nationalist sentiments and has led to the creat.ion of 
nation-building inst.itutions is a valid explanation of t.he 
emergence of some federal public corporations, including t.he 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Air Canada. There were no 
parallels to t.hese public enterprises in t.he United States. The 
cultural, national and cohesive object.ives underlying t.he 
creation of these two public corporat.ions were apparent.. Even 
today, Canadians consider t.he CBC to be cult.ural institution 
nurturing a cultural ident.ity for Canada. 
The political economy approach also provides explanations 
as to why the CBC and Air Canada were created and these 
explanations should not be dismissed. The size of the Canadian 
-
market and the lack of private capital hindered the private 
sector from developing a national radio service or a national air 
carrier, while the size of the United States market gave impetus 
to the growth of private firms, preempting public ownership 
there. 
The political culture approach is static because it fails to 
explain why most of the federal public corporations were created 
after 1960. The elements of the Canadian political culture which 
inclined Canada to use public enterprises took roots even before 
Confederation; however. these cultural traits did not lead to the 
creation of many public enterprises until after 1960. This is 
because there were political and economic changes after 1960. 
which led to the creation of more public enterprises, but which 
the political culture approach does not consider. These cultural 
traits could not possibly explain the creation of PetroCanada in 
1975 and the purchase of Canadair Ltd in 1975. Its static nature 
is another theoretical weakness of the political culture 
approach. 
In recent times, the contradictions between the regions and 
the centre, and between the centre and the United States have 
been less influential in the creation of federal public 
corporations. Constitutional talks between the centre and the 
regions are assuming a new importance in addressing the 
203 
contradiction between the centre and the regions. The Free Trade 
Agreement between Canada and the United States does not suggest 
there would be any serious attempt to create public enterprises 
to stem American influence. The political economy approach 
identifies the dynamism of the situation, especially the postwar 
political economy, which led to the creation of more public 
enterprise to deal with the post war political and economic 
In spite of the explanatory power of the polltlcal economy 
approach, there are certain issues underlying the creation of 
some public enterprises which are not addressed adequately in the 
approach. A case in point is Teleglobe Canada, which was 
created, not so much because of the Canadian political economy. 
but in response to the Commonwealth Telegraph Agreement and the 
cultural disposition of policy makers. The creation of the CBC 
was also motivated, to a large extent, by the Canadian political 
culture. Both approaches have their weaknesses and strengths. 
Having appraised the weaknesses and the strengths of the 
political economy and political culture approaches to the 
explanation of the origins of federal public corporations in 
Canada, it would be untenable to dismiss either of the approaches 
in favour of the other. Though the studies revealed that the 
explanatory power of the political economy approach is stronger 
:;;;~OLI. 
than the political culture approach with respect to specific 
public corporations. the political culture approach offers a 
useful explanation of the background and history of statism in 
Canada which should not be overlooked. 
The public enterprise phenomenon in Canada is complex and 
cannot be explained by a single approach. There is no unicausal 
explanation for the emergence of federal public corporations in 
Canada. However, the weakness of the political economy approach 
could be addressed by incorporating the strengths of the 
political culture approach and other approaches to enhance its 
e~)lanatory power. 
The political economy approach has a relative advantage over 
the political culture approach, because it is able to explain 
better the origins of specific federal public corporations. The 
dynamism of the approach underlines the complexity underlying the 
creation of federal public corporations in Canada. Whatever the 
advantages of the political economy approach it must be 
complemented by certain aspects of the political culture approach 
as well as other models, such as the rational choice theory. to 
enhance its predictive power. 
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